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ABSTRACT 
This thesis evaluates the costs and benefits of the 
Navy's drug prevention policies. Benefits stem from both 
deterrence and detection effects of the policies. By using 
data from the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, and 
Department of Defense Survey of Health Related Behavior 
Among Military Personnel, the existence and magnitude of 
the deterrence effect is estimated. The gross benefits of 
the zero tolerance policy are calculated based on the costs 
avoided by deterring and detecting users. These benefits 
are compared to the total costs of the drug prevention 
program, including replacement costs of discharged 
personnel, and administrative costs. Sensitivity analysis 
suggests that, under reasonable assumptions about the key 
parameters, the program does not generate positive net 
benefits. It is recommended that an analysis of the cost- 
effectiveness of a rehabilitation program for positive drug 
testers be conducted. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
A.   ENVIRONMENT 
"Let us not forget who we are.  Drug abuse is a 
repudiation of everything America is." 
President Ronald Reagan 
Many people believe that a central cause of our social 
ills is the abuse of drugs and alcohol. And despite all 
the extensive public campaigns, like the "This is your 
brain on drugs" television spot that graphically explains 
the physical and psychological consequences of drug abuse 
on one's health, family, and economic well-being, people 
continue to engage in some form of illegal drug use. The 
military is no exception. 
The first indication of a real and threatening drug 
abuse problem in the military arose during the late stages 
of the Vietnam War, when drug abuse was widespread (as high 
as 50 percent in some units) . [Ref. 1] In 1981 the drug 
abuse problem rose to the forefront of the Navy's 
consciousness due to a tragic airplane crash aboard the 
carrier USS NIMITZ, in which 14 sailors were killed. A 
later autopsy revealed the evidence of marijuana use among 
six of the 13 sailors and nonprescription antihistamine use 
by the pilot. [Ref. 2] 
The U.S. military, a mirror image of society and its 
values, quickly set the agenda that drug use is 
incompatible with the way "we do business" in the military. 
Therefore, the Department of Defense (DoD) implemented a 
"zero tolerance" drug policy in 1982, which remains today 
as the cornerstone of its prevention program. The system 
is designed to deter drug use by service members while 
promoting readiness within the operational ranks. After 
all, drug use is a national security concern that not only 
affects the Department of Defense, but ultimately American 
society as a whole. When service members engage in any 
sort of drug activity, they threaten their readiness to 
defend our nation at a moment's notice. 
B.   OBJECTIVES 
This thesis examines the costs and effectiveness of 
the Navy's drug prevention program. One component of the 
analysis is to analyze the deterrence effect the drug 
prevention program had on the Navy work force in 1979/1980, 
1985, and in 1995. This helps to establish a baseline for • 
computing the impact of the program on drug use and to 
assess the associated economic benefits.  In addition, the 
costs of the "zero tolerance" policy are evaluated. 
C.   THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The questions that this research answers are: 
• Did the implementation of the Navy's drug 
prevention policies achieve the desired results 
of minimizing drug use? 
• What is the cost associated with the current 
"zero tolerance" policy? 
• What are the overall costs and benefits of the 
drug testing and "zero tolerance" program? 
D.   DISCUSSION 
"Zero tolerance" implies immediate military separation 
of sailors and officers who test positive for illicit drugs 
during random urinalysis testing. This thesis analyzes the 
deterrence effect of this "zero tolerance" program by 
comparing differences in illegal drug use between military 
and civilian populations, using data from the National 
Household Survey of Drug Abuse (NHSDA) and the Department 
of Defense's Worldwide Survey of Health Related Behaviors 
(DODWWS). The findings from this analysis of the deterrence 
effect establish a portion of the total benefits of the 
Navy drug prevention program. 
By enforcing "zero tolerance" the Navy is stating that 
it will not tolerate any type of illegal drug use from its 
sailors and officers.  This thesis evaluates the cost and 
benefits of fully enforcing "zero tolerance." In 
particular, this thesis estimates the loss of human capital 
in the form of the replacement cost of those who are 
discharged in compliance with the Navy's "zero tolerance" 
policy. This thesis also attempts to evaluate the economic 
efficiency of the "zero tolerance" policy. 
E.   ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter II presents the history of the DoD's and 
Navy's drug prevention programs. Chapter III estimates the 
existence and possible magnitude of the deterrence effect 
associated with drug testing and the "zero tolerance" 
policy. Chapter IV calculates the replacement cost 
associated with the enforcement of the "zero tolerance" 
policy, which requires positive drug testers to be 
discharged from the U.S. Navy. Chapter V calculates the 
net benefits to the Navy of the drug prevention program and 
conducts a sensitivity analysis of the resulting net 
benefit estimates. Chapter VI summarizes the conclusions of 
the research and presents recommendations for further 
research. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A.   DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DRUG TESTING POLICY 
A DoD task force was assembled in 1967 to investigate 
possible illegal drug use in the military. [Ref. 2] By 
1970, the findings and recommendations of the task force 
led to the creation of a formal policy, which ultimately 
became the DoD's new urinalysis drug-testing program. This 
policy emphasized the need to identify illegal drug users, 
rehabilitate these users, and return them to full duty 
status. [Ref. 2] This random urinalysis program was 
believed to be the champion in reducing the number of 
illegal drug use within the military. The DoD's drug 
testing program was not intended for disciplinary or 
corrective actions. Instead, the thought was that military 
drug users would be more likely to request help and 
rehabilitation in the absence of negative repercussions. 
Unfortunately, this was not a realistic expectation. 
The Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO) 
discovered two years later that there was a disparity 
between the number of military personnel surveyed who said 
anonymously that they were drug users as compared to the 
official number of military personnel who tested positive 
in the DoD urinalysis testing program. [Ref. 3] 
Furthermore, HumRRO discovered that the DoD drug-testing 
program was not a disincentive to those service members 
interested in using illegal drugs. The results of their 
study prompted DoD to redirect their approach by using the 
results of the drug tests as a starting point for Uniform 
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) procedures. 
However, in July 1974, a Military Court of Appeals 
demanded that DoD stop urinalysis testing altogether if the 
specimen could be used in administrative or punitive 
actions. By this decision, any deterrence effect of the 
DoD program became null and void. After 1974 the drug 
urinalysis program, for the next six years, was used solely 
to indicate service members in need of rehabilitation. 
[Ref. 3] But in 1980, the Military Court of Appeals 
reversed its 1974 decision, permitting DoD to implement a 
drug urinalysis program to be both a deterrent and 
evidence-gathering device. [Ref. 4] 
The  Department  of  Defense published  DoD Directive 
(DoDD) 1010.4 in August 1980.  The intent of this directive 
was  to establish the  Department  of Defense's  drug and 
alcohol abuse policy and standards for all military service 
members, freeing DoD from the ill effects of illegal drug 
use. [Ref. 5]  Points relevant to this thesis, published in 
DoDD 1014.4, include: 
• Assess the alcohol and drug abuse...influencing the 
Department of Defense 
• Not induct persons in the military services who 
are alcohol or drug dependent 
• Deter and detect alcohol and drug abuse within 
the Armed 'Forces 
• Provide continuing education and training...to 
alleviate problems associated with alcohol and 
drug abuse 
• Treat or counsel alcohol and drug abusers and 
rehabilitate the maximum feasible number of 
abusers [Ref. 5] 
This directive also required each service secretary to 
establish and manage urinalysis drug testing programs for 
their respective branch of service. A follow-on directive, 
DODD 1010.1, was established in 1980 to assist the service 
secretaries in meeting this new requirement. 
This new directive was used as a guideline by each 
branch of service in creating its specific drug-testing 
program. In particular, the intent of issuing DoDD 1010.1 
was twofold: 
• Preserve the health of DOD military service 
members by providing appropriate counseling, 
rehabilitation, and medical treatment to those 
identified as drug and alcohol abusers. 
• Give commanders the leverage to evaluate the 
military fitness, good order and discipline, and 
security of their command, through the use of 
drug  testing  results.     And  when  deemed 
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appropriate, take formal action to restore 
command integrity, based on their assessments. 
[Ref. 6] 
DoDD 1010.1 listed guidelines and limitations to using 
drug urinalysis test results. This directive clearly 
stated that urinalysis results could be used, with specific 
restrictions, in punitive or separation proceedings. This 
directive ultimately became the foundation, which each 
branch of service used to create their respective random 
urinalysis testing program. Armed with this new DoD 
policy, the Chief of Naval Operations issued his own policy 
concerning illegal drug offenders. 
B.   DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY DRUG TESTING POLICY 
The Department of the Navy (DoN) established the 
Office of the Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5300.28A 
(SECNAVINST 5300.28A) in January 1984. [Ref. 7] The latest 
revision to this instruction is SECNAVINST 5300.28C, 
submitted in March 1999. [Ref. 8] For the use of this 
paper, the current instruction will be used as reference. 
This  Instruction,  in  accordance with  DoD mandated 
policies,   disseminates  the  regulations  and  policies 
regarding alcohol and drug abuse within DON.   It requires 
the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the Commandant of • 
the Marine Corps (CMC) to establish and enforce alcohol and 
drug abuse prevention programs for their respective branch 
of service. In addition, SECNAVINST 5300.28C identifies 
specific functional areas that both CNO and CMC must 
consider when implementing their respective alcohol and 
drug abuse prevention program: detection and deterrence; 
treatment and rehabilitation; preventive education and 
intervention training; and, enforcement and discipline. 
[Ref. 8] 
In addressing the area of detection and deterrence of 
military drug abuse, SECNAVINST 5300.28C directs the use of 
random urinalysis to disclose drug use among military 
personnel, regardless of rank. The results of mandatory 
urinalysis, subject to certain restrictions, could be used 
to take appropriate disciplinary action; to establish the 
basis for separation proceedings; and to refer military 
members to a treatment or rehabilitation programs. [Ref. 8] 
The Department of the Navy issued the Office of the 
Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 5350.4 (OPNAVINST 
5350.4) in September 1980. As the subject line suggested, 
"Substance Abuse Prevention and Control," this instruction 
established the drug testing policy for all members of the 
United States Navy, which is one of zero tolerance to 
substance abuse in the Navy.   "Zero tolerance recognizes 
9 
that drug and alcohol use is incompatible with the 
maintenance of high standards of performance, military 
discipline, and readiness and is destructive of Navy 
efforts to instill pride and promote professionalism." 
[Ref. 9] In other words, the Navy would simply not tolerate 
any type of legal drug abuse or illicit drug use by their 
military members. 
Although this policy of zero tolerance implied strict 
rules to its members or "else" (facing the consequences), 
the policy itself was not enforced evenly among the ranks. 
There was a "double standard" within the policy where only 
officer and chief petty officers (E-7 to E-9) were 
automatically processed for administrative discharge after 
appropriate punitive proceedings were conducted. However, 
Junior enlisted (E-l to E-6), however, would be screened 
and presented rehabilitation options if their drug abuse 
were determined treatable. Then, following appropriate 
punitive procedures and completed rehabilitation, a junior 
enlisted member could return to full active duty status if 
she/he was deemed worthy for retention. [Ref. 9] This 
"double standard" policy continued until 1990. 
OPNAVINST 5350.4B removed this "double standard" in 
September 1990 when "zero tolerance" became applicable to 
10 
all ranks in the United States Navy. After 1990, when an 
individual was detected for using an illicit drug as a 
result of random drug urinalysis, that individual would be 
processed for separation subsequent to punitive 
proceedings. Nonetheless, discharge would not be the 
automatic result from processing this individual for 
separation. The individual could still remain in the Navy 
if deemed worthy for retention. 
Amplified in OPNAVINST 5350.4B was the Navy's purpose 
for a drug-testing program. Four goals were now established 
for this policy: 
• Create a process for assessing command readiness 
• Deter drug use 
• Use as a tool to monitor personnel in 
rehabilitation programs 
• Institute a historical archive that can be used 
to track the demographic characteristics of Navy 
drug use [Ref. 10] 
For the purpose of this thesis, the goal of deterring 
drug use is the main focus of research. 
11 
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Ill.DETERRENCE EFFECT 
A.   INTRODUCTION 
As described in the previous chapter, the Navy's "zero 
tolerance" policy towards the nonmedical drug use among 
military members was implemented in 1981. The question that 
is addressed in this chapter of the thesis is by how much 
did the policy change the behavior of its work force? Did 
the policy deter military personnel from using drugs and, 
if so, to what extent? 
A previous study by Mehay and Pacula [Ref. 11], on 
which our analysis is based, uses a civilian and military 
sample for both the pre- and post-implementation phase 
(before and after 1981) to compare the difference in drug 
use between military members and civilian workers before 
and after policy enactment. As a representative sample of 
the civilian population Mehay and Pacula used the National 
Household Survey on Drug Abuse (NHSDA), and for the 
military population the Department of Defense Worldwide 
Survey of Health Related Behaviors Among Military Personnel 
(DODWWS) was used. Because there was no single year prior 
to 1981 when both surveys were fielded, Mehay & Pacula 
merged the data from the 1979 NHSDA and the 1980 DODWWS. 
13 
Mehay and Pacula chose these two surveys because they 
immediately preceded the implementation of the military's 
program. These two merged surveys formed the "baseline" for 
comparison. 
To estimate the deterrence effect caused by the 
policy, Mehay & Pacula used the 1995 NHSDA and DODWWS. 
Using multiple regression analysis, two dependent variables 
of interest were constructed, one that focuses on the 
illicit drug use in the past 12 months and one reflecting 
any drug use in the past month. Findings of their study 
clearly show a significant difference in drug use among 
military members compared to their civilian counterparts as 
well as a significant difference in drug use among military 
members before and after the implementation of the "zero 
tolerance" policy. This is termed the difference-in- 
difference estimate. [Ref. 11] One potential weakness of 
the Mehay-Pacula study, however, is the long time lag 
between the pre- and post-implementation years. There were 
15 years between the two survey years (1979/80 - 1995). It 
is argued that: 
There may have been changes in the recruiting 
strategy employed by the military that would make 
the military population more or less like the 
civilian population over time in ways we have not 
measured. [Ref. 11] 
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Thus, differences in drug use may arise due to other 
changes over this long period rather than to implementation 
of the drug prevention program. 
B.   METHODOLOGY 
1.   General Outline 
In order to estimate the deterrence effect of the 
policy, we use the 197 9 NHSDA as a representative sample of 
a civilian population and the 1980 DODWWS as the respective 
sample  of  the,,  military  population  prior  to  the 
implementation of the policy. The 1979/80 military-civilian 
data file serves as a baseline for comparison with later 
years' surveys. To offset the long time lag between the 
1979/80 surveys and the 1995 surveys, we use surveys that 
were fielded in 1985 (both NHSDA and DODWWS), a year that 
immediately  followed  the  implementation  of  the  drug 
prevention  policy.  We  compare  the  difference  in  the 
deterrence  effect  between  1979/80  and  1985  with  that 
estimated between the 1979/80 and 1995, as done in Mehay & 
Pacula. This gives us the opportunity to not only estimate 
the direct effect of the policy (1979/80 - 1985) but also 
to estimate how the deterrence effect changed over time, if 
at all (1985 - 1995) . 
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2.   Analysis of the NHSDA Data 
The NHSDA is a series of surveys that measure the 
prevalence and correlates of drug use in the U.S. civilian 
population. The surveys are designed to provide not only 
quarterly but also annual estimates.  The NHSDA provides 
information on the illicit use of drugs, alcohol, tobacco, 
and  nonmedical  use  of  prescription  drugs  among  U.S. 
households.  NHSDA  include  questions  on  socioeconomic 
characteristics, such as age, martial status, gender, race, 
ethnicity,  job  status,  and education.  Furthermore,  the 
surveys provide information on annual and past month usage 
for  the  following  drug  categories:  cannabis,  cocaine, 
hallucinogens,  heroin,  inhalants,  alcohol,  tobacco,  and 
nonmedical   use   of   prescription   drugs,   including 
psychotherapeutics and polysubstance use [Ref. 12]. 
The 1979 NHSDA is the sixth in a series of studies 
that began in 1971. It was sponsored by the National 
Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) . The data were collected by 
the Response Analysis Corporation, Princeton, NJ. Research 
Triangle Institute, Research Triangle Park, NC, prepared 
the data and codebook for public release. The survey 
includes U.S. households ages 12 years and older. In the 
197 9 NHSDA respondents from rural areas were oversampled. . 
16 
The nominative technique was used to elicit supplementary 
information about heroin use. All NHSDA are   stratified 
multi-stage area probability samples. In the first stage, 
103 districts or Primary Sample Units (PSU) were screened. 
13,578 households were originally listed, 12,334 were found 
to be occupied and 8,718 were eligible for interview. To 
reduce reporting bias,  the NHSDA uses  self-administered 
questionnaires.   7,224  questionnaires  were  completed, 
yielding a response rate of 82.9%. [Ref. 12] 
The 1985 NHSDA is the eighth survey, also including 
U.S. households aged 12 years and older. NIDA again 
sponsored the survey, which was conducted by Temple 
University Institute for Survey Research, Philadelphia, PA. 
Research Triangle Institute prepared the data and codebook 
for public release. In the 1985 NHSDA, blacks and Hispanics 
were oversampled in order to increase the reliability of 
estimates of drug use for these important groups. 112 PSU 
were originally listed, 25,968 households were screened of 
which 23,633 were selected for interview; 9,630 were 
eligible. 8,038 questionnaires were completed, yielding a 
response rate of 91% [Ref. 13 and Ref. 14]. 
The 1995 NHSDA is the fifteenth survey, including U.S. 
households  of  age  12  years  and  older.  It  originally 
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contained 115 PSU. 22,000 households were screened of which 
11,1 Al interviews were completed, yielding a response rate 
of 80.6% [Ref. 15 and Ref. 16]. 
Some limitations  of the NHSDA,  however,  should be 
noted here: 
• All surveys are self-reported. Hence, the value 
of the data highly depends on the respondents' 
truthfulness and memory. On the other side, self- 
reporting reduces the possibility of reporting 
bias due to increased confidentiality. 
• The surveys are all cross-sectional and not 
longitudinal. This means that the data provide a 
snapshot in a single year rather than measuring 
changes in the same group of individuals over 
time. 
• The target population of the surveys is defined 
as the households of the contiguous U.S. (without 
Alaska and Hawaii). Two percent of the total 
population have been excluded: 
• Noninstitutional group quarters (such as 
military installations, college dormitories, 
group houses) 
• Institutional group quarters (such as 
prisons, nursing homes, treatment centers) 
• Persons with no permanent address (such as 
homeless and residents of single rooms in 
hotels) 
3.   Analysis of DODWWS Data 
The DODWWS, which is sponsored by the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs), provides 
comprehensive and detailed estimates of the prevalence of 
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alcohol use, nonmedical drug use, and tobacco use among 
active duty military. [Ref. 17] 
DODWWS started in 1980 and its overall purpose is to 
determine the nature, causes and effects of illicit 
substance use and health behavior among military personnel. 
It also allows evaluation of the impact of current and 
future program policies targeting substance use and health 
decisions in this population [Ref. 11] . All DODWWS contain 
active duty personnel only, excluding recruits, service 
academy students, persons without leave, and persons who 
were in a state of change of station (PCS) . To reduce 
reporting bias, the DODWWS use self-reported questionnaires 
rather than interviewer-administered data collection 
techniques. [Ref. 18] 
The 1980 DODWWS is the first in a series of surveys 
and was conducted by Burt Associates. It contains 19,582 
randomly selected military members (6,239 Army, 5,202 Navy, 
2,861 Marine Corps, and 5,280 Air Force), yielding a 
response rate of 93% [Ref. 17]. 
The 1985 DODWWS is the third survey and was conducted 
by the Research Triangle Institute. 17,328 questionnaires 
were completed (5,879 Army, 4,335 Navy, 1,882 Marine Corps, 
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and 5,232 Air Force), yielding a response rate of 80% [Ref. 
19 and Ref. 20]. 
The 1995 DODWWS was the sixth survey and again 
conducted by Research Triangle Institute. The final data 
set included 16,303 questionnaires (3,638 Army, 4,265 Navy, 
3,960 Marine Corps, and 4,440 Air Force), yielding a 
response rate of 69.6% [Ref. 21 and Ref. 22]. Table 1 
summarizes the sample sizes and response rates in the 
surveys used in this thesis. 
Survey Year Survey Sample Size Response Rate 
1979 NHSDA 7,224 82.9% 
1980 DODWWS (total) 19,582 93% 
Army 6,239 
Navy 5,202 
Marine Corps 2,861 
Air Force 5,280 
1985 NHSDA 8,038 91% 
DODWWS (total) 17,328 80% 
Army 5,879 
Navy 4,335 
Marine Corps 1,882 
Air Force 5,232 
1995 NHSDA 17,747 80.6% 
DODWWS (total) 16,303 69.6% 
Army 3,638 
Navy 4,265 
Marine Corps 3,960 
Air Force 4,440 
Table 1.  Sample Sizes and Response Rates NHSDA/DODWWS. 
20 
4.   The Model 
As in Mehay & Pacula, two indexes of respondents' 
illicit drug use are the focus of the analysis, one 
reflecting any illicit drug use in the past 12 months and 
one reflecting any use in the past month. Table 2 provides 
definitions of the analysis variables and means of the 1985 
NHSDA and DODWWS. Appendices A and B list the respective 
mean values for the 1979 NHSDA/1980 DODWWS as well as the 
1995 NHSDA/DODWWS. Note that the 1985 NHSDA is restricted 
to 17-49 year olds in order to align civilians with the age 
groups represented in the military sample. The military 
sample contains 16,933 observations; the civilian sample is 
restricted to 17-49 year olds and consists of 5,037 
observations. 
As can be seen from Table 1, both past-month (current) 
as well as past-year participation are significantly lower 
among military members, compared to the civilian sample, 
after the implementation of the "zero tolerance" policy. 
There are, however, a number of demographic differences 
that may be driving the usage differences, such as 
education level, race/ethnicity, age, and martial status, 
which suggests the necessity of multivariate regression 
analysis. In order to compare the findings of the three 
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different data points (i.e. 1979/80, 1985, and 1995), three 
models are constructed using available independent 
variables from the surveys. Standard demographic 
characteristics such as gender, age, martial status, 
race/ethnicity, and education level were available in all 
surveys. 










Age 17 - 20 
Age 21 - 25 
Age 26 - 34 





=1 if respondent reports using any 
illicit drug in the past month 
=1 if respondent reports using any 
illicit drug in the past year 
=1 if respondent is married 
=1 if respondent has high school diploma 
=1 if respondent attended college but did 
not attain diploma 
=1 if respondent has college degree 
=1 if respondent's age (in years) 
falls in category 
=1 if respondent's age (in years) 
falls in category 
=1 if respondent's age (in years) 
falls in category 
=1 if respondent's age (in years) 
falls in category 
=1 if respondent is Black , Negro or 
African American 
=1 if respondent is Hispanic 
=1 if respondent is other racial / ethnic 
minority 
































Note:  Restricted to ages 17 -49. 
Military sample = 16,933; civilian sample = 5,037 
Standard Deviation in parenthesis 
The military sample includes officers and enlisted 
The civilian sample includes all civilians 
Table 2.  Means from 1985 NHSDA and DODWWS. 
Other characteristics known to be significantly 
correlated with illicit drug use, such as the presence of 
children, urbanity, current living arrangements, and 
religious orientation, were either unavailable or not 
collected in a consistent fashion [Ref. 11] . Hence, these 
variables are omitted. 
For the DODWWS, no geographic identifiers were 
available. These identifiers would have allowed including 
geographic specific drug price information. Unless military 
installations are consistently placed in areas where drug 
prices are systematically different, however, the omission 
of price variables in demand equation is unlikely to bias 
the coefficient of the dependent variables. Even if 
geographic location information were available, it would be 
extremely difficult to implement a geographic price 
measurement due to the unique geographic mobility of 
military personnel (e.g. deployment) [Ref. 11]. 
Furthermore, officers from the military sample were 
omitted because of the very low drug use  rates among 
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officers compared to enlisted service members [Ref. 21] . 
Officers, in their role as leaders, have more to lose by- 
using drugs and are more indoctrinated into the military 
system and its culture. In addition, as will be described 
in the following chapter, actual positive drug test results 
indicate that about 99% of the drug usage occurs in the 
enlisted ranks, which justifies the focus on enlisted 
military personnel. 
In order to align the civilian sample to its military 
counterpart (enlisted only), all civilians in professional, 
technical, and administrative occupations ("white-collar" 
occupations) were deleted from the sample. Only individuals 
in "blue-collar" occupations are included. 
As mentioned above, the vast majority of service 
members are aged between 17 and 4 9 years. In order to align 
the civilian sample to the military population, four age 
groups were formed: (Age 1: 17-20, Age 2: 21-25, Age 3: 26- 
34, and Age 4: 35-49). 
The two dependent variables of interest (past year and 
past month drug participation) are both mutually exclusive 
and collectively exhaustive [Ref. 23] . Since the dependent 
variables  are binary,  the  following non-linear maximum- 
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likelihood (logit) function for the regression analysis was 
used [Ref. 24]: 
P(Drugl2l=l)=      l 
P(Drug30i = 1) = 1 
l + e -z, 
where:    Drugl2i = Probability that the ith person will 
have used drugs within the last 12 months. 
Drug30i = Probability that the ith person will 
have used drugs within the last month. 
The actual specification of the logit estimating 
model is as follows: 
Zi = ßo + ßi Military + ß2 Female + ß3 Married + 
ß4 Black + ß5 Hispanic + ß6 Other Race + 
ß7 Agel + ß8 Age2 + ß9 Age3 + ßi0 High School 
Degree + ßn Some College + 
ßx2 College Graduate + e±. 
Appendix C shows an example of the SAS code for the 
merged data files for 1979/80. 
C.   FINDINGS 
1.   Combined Drug Participation Model 
Tables 3-5 provide definitions and means of the 
analysis variables for the merged 1979 NHSDA and 1980 
DODWWS data file,  the merged 1985 NHSDA/DODWWS,  and the 
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merged 1995 NHSDA/DODWWS file. Note the smaller sample 
sizes (compared to Table 1 and Appendixes A and B) due to 
sample restrictions. Since this analysis uses a binary 
dependent variable, marginal effects were calculated to 
allow an interpretation of the estimated coefficients' 
magnitude. Except for the dummy variables accounting for 
being in the military (evaluated as a change from 0 = 
civilian to 1 = military) , all other variables were kept at 
their mean values. As a base case for estimating the 
marginal effects, a notional person with the following 
characteristics was chosen: white, civilian, single, male, 
no high school degree, age 35-49. 




























Age 17 - 20 
Age 21 - 25 
''.  if respondent reports using any 
illicit drug in the past month 
:1 if respondent reports using any 
illicit drug in the past year 
■1 if respondent is married 
=1 if respondent has high school diploma 
=1 if respondent attended college but did 
not attain diploma 
=1 if respondent has college degree 
=1 if respondent's age (in years) 
falls in category 
■lif respondent's age (in years) 
falls in category 
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Age  26  -  34 = 1  if respondent's  age   (in years) 0.253 0.212 
falls  in category (0.435) (0.408) 
Age  35  -  49 = 1  if  respondent's  age   (in years) 0.127 0.223 
falls  in category (0.333) (0.417) 
Black =1  if  respondent  is  Black  ,   Negro or 0.194 0.118 
African American (0.395) (0.322) 




Other Minority =1  if respondent  is  other racial  /  ethnic 0.032 0.030 
minority (0.175) (0.170) 




Note: Restricted to ages  17  -49. 
Military sample  deletes  officers 
Civilian sample deletes professionals  and college graduates 
Military sample =  13,385;   civilian  sample = 3, 881 
Standard Deviation in parenthesis 
Table 3. Means   from  1979  NHSDA and  1980 DODWWS   fil es, 
Restricted  to  Military Enlisted,   Civilian  Non- 
Professionals. 




























Age 17 - 20 
Age 21 - 25 
Age 26 - 34 
=1 if respondent reports using any 
illicit drug in the past month 
=1 if respondent reports using any 
illicit drug in the past year 
=1 if respondent is married 
=1 if respondent has high school diploma 
=1 if respondent attended college but did 
not attain diploma 
=1 if respondent has college degree 
=1 if respondent's age (in years) 
falls in category 
=1 if respondent's age (in years) 
falls in category 
=1 if respondent's age (in years) 
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0.348 0.403 
falls in category (0.476) (0.490) 





=1 if respondent's age (in years) 
falls in category 
=1 if respondent is Black , Negro or 
African American 
=1 if respondent is Hispanic 
=1 if respondent is other racial / 
ethnic minority 











Note:  Restricted to ages 17 -49. 
Military sample deletes officers 
Civilian sample deletes professionals and college graduates 
Military sample = 13,151; civilian sample = 4,260 
Standard Deviation in parenthesis 
Table 4.  Means from 1985 NHSDA and DODWWS Files, 
Restricted to Military Enlisted, Civilian Non- 
Professionals . 






























Age 17 - 20 
Age 21 - 25 
Age 26 - 34 
Age 35 - 49 
=1 if respondent reports using any 
illicit drug in the past month 
=1 if respondent reports using any 
illicit drug in the past year 
=1 if respondent is married 
=1 if respondent has high school 
diploma 
=1 if respondent attended college but did 
not attain diploma 
=1 if respondent has college degree 
=1 if respondent's age (in years) 
falls in category 
=1 if respondent's age (in years) 
falls in category 
=1 if respondent's age (in years) 
falls in category 
=1 if respondent's age (in years) 
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0.341 0.200 
falls in category- 
Black =1 if respondent is Black, Negro or 
African American 
Hispanic =1 if respondent is Hispanic 
Other Minority        =1 if respondent is other racial / ethnic 
minority 










Note:  Restricted to age's 17 -49. 
Military sample deletes officers 
Civilian sample deletes professionals and college graduates 
Military sample = 12,487; civilian sample = 9,882 
Standard Deviation in parenthesis 
Table 5.  Means from 1995 NHSDA and DODWWS Files, 
Restricted to Military Enlisted, Civilian Non- 
Professionals. 
Table 6 shows estimates of the coefficient of the 
military dummy variable and the associated marginal effects 
for the 1979/80 NHSDA/DODWWS data. Column 1 shows estimates 
foe drug use models for the 17-4 9 age group, while Columns 
2 and 3 of Table 6 provide estimates of drug use models for 
the 17-34 year olds and 17-25 year olds, respectively. 
Coefficient estimates of the full logit model of using any 
illicit drug in the past year and in the past month are 
recorded in Appendix D. 
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Ages Ages Ages 
17 - 49 17 -34 17 - 25 
Past Year 0.0909 0.1435 0.252 
Participation (0.0495)a (0.051) (0.056) 
[1.998]b [3.482] [6.281] 
{0.3164}° {0.3974} {0.4822} 
Past Month -0.503 -0.4598 -0.3797 
Participation (0.0541) (0.055) (0.060) 
[-7.304] [-8.287] [-8.076] 
{0.2155} {0.2801} {0.3497} 
N 17,266 14,703 10,495 
Notes:      Based on merged 197 9 NHSDA / 1980 DODWWS file; 
NHSDA is  restricted to  ages   17-4 9. 
Military sample  deletes  officers 
Civilian sample deletes  professionals 
a
  Standard errors  are  reported in parentheses 
b
 Marginal  effects  in brackets   (in percentage points) 
c
 Baseline  predicted probability  for  civilians 
Table   6.     Logit  Estimates  of Military  Coefficient   in  Drug 
Participation Models,   1979/1980   Data,   Restricted  Samples. 
Table 6 shows that in 1979/80 the military population 
as a whole (17-49 year olds) was slightly more likely to 
have used drugs within the past year compared to civilians. 
A look at the past month participation probability, 
however, reveals that military members (17-49 years old) 
are about 7.3 percentage points less likely to have used 
drugs within the last month. Note that these difference 
estimates were calculated from survey data that was 
collected in 1979/1980, which was prior to the 
implementation  of  the military's   drug prevention program. 
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Table 7 provides the results of the marginal effects 
for the data from the post-implementation year 1985 
(NHSDA/DODWWS) . Coefficient estimates from the full 
logistic specifications of the probability of using any 
illicit drug in the past year and in the past month are 
recorded in Appendix E. In 1985 the past year participation 
probability is 17.635 percentage points lower among 17-49 
year olds in the military. The past month participation 
probability for the same age group is 11.08 percentage 
points lower for military personnel. Both drug measures 
suggest the military's drug prevention program generated a 
sizeable deterrence effect among military members by 1985. 
A comparison of drug use rates for the age groups 17-34 and 
17-25 indicate that the difference in drug use between the 
military and civilian population between 1979/80 and 1985 
for the younger age groups is even greater than for all age 
groups. 
A comparison of the difference in the illicit drug use 
between civilians and military members and between the two 
survey years does not, however, provide any insight into 
whether the military's workforce changed its behavior 
toward drug use. The difference could be the result of a 
change in the behavior of drug use among the civilian 
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population. In order to determine whether a change in 
behavior among military personnel was due to the policy 
change, we apply the previously mentioned difference-in- 
difference estimate, in which the difference between the 
military and civilian population from one survey year is 
compared to that of another survey year. The findings show 
a difference-in-difference for past year participation 
between 1979/80 and 1985 of -19.633 percentage points and 
difference-in-difference of -3.776 percentage points for 
past month participation. This clearly shows a positive 
deterrence effect resulting from the implementation of the 
policy. 
Ages 
17   -   49 
Past  Year 
Participation 























Notes:        Based on merged  1985  NHSDA and DODWWS   file 
NHSDA is   restricted  to  ages   17-4 9. 
Military sample  deletes  officers 
Civilian  sample  deletes  professionals 
a
  Standard errors  are  reported in parentheses 
b
 Marginal  effects  in brackets   (in percentage points) 
c
 Baseline predicted probability for  civilians 
Table  7.     Logit  Estimates  of Military  Coefficient   in  Drug 
Participation Models,   1985   Data,   Restricted  Samples. 
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We are also interested in whether the deterrence 
effect changed over time. We analyze this by comparing the 
military-civilian difference in 1979/80 with the military- 
civilian difference in the 1995 NHSDA/DODWWS data. 
Coefficient estimates from logistic specifications of the 
probability of using any illicit drug in the past year and 
in the past month are recorded in Appendix F. Table 8 shows 
the logit coefficients and marginal effects of the military 
dummy variables for the 1995 data file. As can be seen, 
both past year and past month participation probabilities 
for the military are lower than their civilian counterparts 
throughout all age groups. 
Ages Ages Ages 
17 - 49 17 -34 17 - 25 
Past Year -1.3447 -1.2763 -1.129 
Participation (0.0574)a (0.061) (0.072) 
[-10.65]b [-13.177] [-15.135] 
{0.1507}c {0.1951} {0.2474} 
Past Month -1.4968 -1.4414 -1.3009 
Participation (0.0767) (0.081) (0.096) 
[-6.52] [-8.251] [-9.561] 
{0.0858} {0.1112} {0.1371} 
N 23,369 16,142 9,112 
Notes:   Based on merged 1995 NHSDA and DODWWS file 
NHSDA  is   restricted  to  ages   17-49. 
Military sample  deletes  officers 
Civilian  sample  deletes  professionals 
a
  Standard errors  are  reported in parenthesis 
b
 Marginal  effects  in brackets   (in percentage points) 
c
 Baseline predicted probability  for  civilians 
Table  8.     Logit  Estimates  of Military Coefficient  in  Drug 
Participation Models,   1995   Data,   Restricted  Samples. 
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A comparison of the 1995 findings to 1979/80 shows 
that the difference in past year participation between 
military and civilians decreased from +1.998 percentage 
points in 1979/80 to -10.65 percentage points in 1995, a 
difference-in-difference of -12.648 percentage points. On 
the other side, the military-civilian difference in current 
drug usage (past month participation) changed from -7.304 
percentage points in 1979/80 to -6.52 percentage points in 
1995, suggesting that there is no deterrence effect using 
this drug-use indicator. From the results, it seems as if 
the policy had only a small deterrence effect on the 
youngest age group (17-25-year-olds). 
Second, a comparison of the 1995 probabilities to 
those of 1985 shows that after the military-civilian 
differences significantly dropped between 1979/80-1985, 
they all increased from 1985-1995 for all age groups. The 
complete difference-in-difference results are displayed in 
Table 9. This leads to the conclusion that the initial 
deterrence effect from the policy has not changed much over 
time. Because the baseline civilian predicted drug use 
probabilities are lower than in 1995 than in 1985, however, 
the percentage reduction in military drug use in 1995 is 
actually greater than in 1985. In 1985, for example, past- 
34 
month   use   was   about   50%   lower   for   17-25   year   olds,   whereas 
in  1995,   it  was  nearly  70%  lower. 
Difference -in - Difference (1979/80 - 1985) 
Ages Ages Ages 
17 - 49 17 -34 17 - 25 
Past Year [-19.633] [-26.142] [-27.181] 
Participation 
Past Month . [-3.776] [-6.443] [-4.656] 
Participation 
Difference -in - Difference (1979/80 - 1995) 
Ages Ages Ages 
17 - 49 17 -34 17 - 25 
Past Year [-12.648] [-16.659] [-21.416] 
Participation 
Past Month [0.216] [0.036] [-1.484] 
Participation 
Difference - in - Difference (1985 - - 1995) 
Ages 















Note: Differences  calculated as  difference  in 
military-civilian drug participation  rates 
between two years. 
Source:   uses  coefficients   from Tables   6-8   in text. 
Table  9.     Difference-in-Difference Analysis  Drug 
Participation Models,   Restricted Samples. 
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2.   Restricted Samples, Males only 
As can be seen from Table 10 the representation of 
females is quite different in the civilian and military 
samples, ranging from 8.1% in the military (1985 DODWWS) to 
60.2% in the civilian sector (1995 NHSDA). Although males 
and females are more or less equally distributed among the 
NHSDA (civilian sample) , females are significantly under- 
represented in the DODWWS due to the prohibition on women 
serving in combat"4 occupations . 
Survey Year 
DODWWS NHSDA 
1979/80 9% 56.10% 
1985 8.10% 56.50% 
1995 18.80% 60.20% 
Table 10. Female Distribution of Respondents in NHSDA and 
DODWWS Surveys. 
The models  above  assume  that  the  estimated model 
coefficients are the same for males and females.  It is 
quite possible, however, that the effect of being in the 
military has a different effect in terms of drug behavior 
for males and females.  To test the assumption of equal 
coefficients, we apply a Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT). This 
test provides information on whether we may reject the 
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following null hypotheses, which imposes a restriction on 
the model of equal coefficients: 
H0: ßi=ß2=ß3=...= ßn=0 (R) 
Hu ß^ß2^ß3#...#ßn^0 (URi) 
H2: ß1#ß2^ß3^...^ßn#0 (UR2) 
where:    R = Restricted Model, pooling males and 
females 
URi = Unrestricted Model, males only 
UR2 = Unrestricted Model, females only 






2iLUR    ~LR]~Z2 f 
which can be re-written as: 
^ = 2[(I>Mfe +Lmole)-LR]~z2 
In order to reject the null hypothesis, the test 
statistic, X must be greater than the critical Chi Square 
for the chosen level of significance. Table 11 summarizes 
the findings of the Likelihood Ratio Tests. The results 
support rejection of the null hypothesis in nearly all 
cases, thus rejecting the use of the restricted (pooled) 
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models. The only exception is for 17-to-25 year olds in 
1985. Consequently, we re-estimated the drug use models for 





Chi-Square a Year 
1979/80 
Ages 17-49 242 .34 12 21.00 
Ages 17-34 221 .97 11 19.68 
Ages 17-25 188 .29 10 18.31 
1985 
Ages 17-49 36. 16 12 21.00 
Ages 17-34 33. 33 11 19.68 
Ages 17-25 12. 20 10 18.31 
1995 
Ages l~-49 4 3 . 64 12 21.00 
Ages I"-34 j -i . 17 11 19.68 




X D.F. Chi-Square a 
193.33 12 21.00 
177.83 11 19.68 
159.33 10 18.31 
29.55 12 21.00 
29.65 11 19.68 
15.22 10 18.31 
40.27 12 21.00 
35.45 11 19.68 
24.69 10 18.31 
Notes: Level of Significance 
Degree of Freedom 
Table 11. Results Likelihood Ratio Test. 
Besides the use of males only, the earlier 
restrictions (exclusion of professionals as well as 
restricting the age to 17-49 year olds) were also applied 
to the civilian and military (exclusion of officers) 
surveys. Coefficient estimates of the military dummy 
variables from full logistic specifications of the 
probability of using any illicit drug in the past year and 
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in the past month are recorded in Appendix G. Table 12 
summarizes the findings for the merged 1979/80 data file. 
Overall, male military members are 0.215 percentage 
points less likely to have used drugs within the last year. 
Among the younger age groups (columns 2 and 3), however, 
military members are more likely to have used drugs within 
the last year. For past month drug participation, military 
males are about 10 percentage points less likely to use 
drugs. 
Ages Ages Ages 
17 - 49 17 -34 17 - 25 
Past Year -0.009 0.0615 0.197 
Participation (0.0611)a (0.063) (0.070) 
[-0.215]b [1.516] [4.887] 
{0.3493} {0.4336} {0.5199} 
Past Month -0.63 -0.5712 -0.4681 
Participation (0.0631) (0.065) (0.071) 
[-9.586] [-10.874] [-10.428] 
{0.2479} {0.3165} {0.3912} 
N 13,723 11,730 8,284 
Notes:   Based on merged 197 9 NHSDA / 1980 DODWWS file 
a
 Standard errors are reported in parenthesis 
b
 Marginal effects in brackets (in percentage points) 
c
 Baseline predicted probability for civilians 
Table 12. Logit Estimates of Military Coefficient in Drug 
Participation Models, 1979 and 1980 Data, Restricted 
Samples, Males Only. 
The  deterrence  effect  of  the policy  on  the male 
military population toward the illicit use of nonmedical 
drugs  in  1985  is  displayed  in  Table  13.  Coefficient 
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estimates from the full logistic specifications of the 
probability of using any illicit drug in the past year and 
in the past month are recorded in Appendix H. As can be 
seen, the drug use rate among male military members ages 
17-49 within the last year is 16.22 points lower than 
civilians in 1985.' The difference-in-difference is 16.01 
percentage points between 1980 and 1985 (from -0.215 to - 
16.22 percentage points). The difference-in-difference for 
the younger age groups is between 20 and 24 percentage 
points. Using the past month participation rate shows that, 
for 17-49 year olds, the difference-in-difference is nearly 
zero. 
Ages Ages Ages 
17 - 49 17 -34 17 - 25 
Past Year -1.5145 -1.4397 -1.044 
Participation (0.0681)a (0.071) (0.092) 
[-16.22]b [-24.298] [-20.891] 
{0.2208}c {0.3611} ■ {0.3972} 
Past Month -1.3768 -1.3292 -0.9047 
Participation (0.0771) (0.080) (0.104) 
[-9.516] [-16.264] [-13.256] 
{0.1322} {0.2396} {0.2532} 
N 13,849 9,309 4,537 
Notes:   Based on merged 1985 NHSDA and DODWWS file 
a
   Standard  errors   are   reported  in parenthesis 
b
 Marginal  effects  in brackets   (in percentage points) 
c
 Baseline predicted probability for  civilians 
Table  13.   Logit  Estimates  of Military Coefficient  in  Drug 
Participation Models,   1985  Data,   Restricted Samples,   Males 
Only. 
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The difference-in-difference is 5.39 percentage points 
and 2.82 percentage points for the 17-34 and 17-25 year 
olds, respectively. 
To address the question of the change in the 
deterrence effect over time, the model was again applied to 
the 1995 NHSDA/DODWWS data file but using data on males 
only. Coefficient estimates from logistic specifications of 
the probability of using any illicit drug in the past year 
and in the past month are recorded in Appendix I. Table 14 
summarizes the findings, and shows that both the past year 
and past month drug participation rates are significantly 
lower among male military members than their civilian 
counterparts, and that the military-civilian difference is 
lower in 1995 than it was in 1979/80. 
Ages 
17   -  49 
Ages 
17   -34 
Ages 
17  -  25 




















N 14,068 9,617 5,673 
Notes:            Based on merged  1995 NHSDA and DODWWS  files 
* Standard errors are reported in parenthesis 
b
 Marginal effects in brackets (in percentage points) 
c
 Baseline predicted probability for civilians 
Table 14. Logit Estimates of Military Coefficient in Drug 
Participation Models, 1995 Data, Restricted Samples, Males 
Only. 
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Comparison with previous survey years, however, shows 
different results. In 1995 male military members were 
12.095 percentage points less likely to use drugs within 
the last year (17-49 year olds), a difference-in-difference 
of -11.88 percentage points compared to 1980. A look at the 
current (past month) drug participation probability, 
however, shows again that the difference-in-difference is 
+1.96 percentage points. Even among the younger age groups, 
the difference-in-differences are nearly zero for past 
month drug use. Table 15 summarizes the difference-in- 
difference results. 
Difference -in - Difference (1979/80 - - 1985) 
Ages Ages Ages 
17 - 49 17 -34 17 - 25 
Past Year [-16.01]        [ -25.814] [-25.778] 
Participation 
Past Month [0.47] [-5.39] [-2.828] 
Participation 
Difference -in - Difference (1979/80 - - 1995) 
Ages Ages Ages 
17 - 49 17 -34 17 - 25 
Past Year [-11.88]        [ -17.124] [-21.818] 
Participation 
Past Month [1.963] [0.322] [-0.934] 
Participation 
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Difference - in - Difference (1985 - 1995) 
Ages Ages Ages 











Note: Differences  calculated as  difference  in 
military-civilian drug participation rates 
between two  years. 
Source:   uses  coefficients   from Tables   12-14   in  text. 
Table   15.   Difference-in-Difference Analysis   Drug 
Participation Models,   Restricted  Samples,   Males   Only. 
3.        Results  for Navy Personnel 
As        described        in        the        previous chapter        the 
implementation of the "zero tolerance" policy and its 
enforcement has varied within the military across the 
branches. The Army, for example, has the lowest drug- 
testing rate, while the Air Force has the strictest 
recruiting policy among the branches. Both factors (testing 
rate and selection) might influence the deterrence effect 
[Ref. 4]. Hence, we re-estimated our initial model by 
replacing the single military variable with dummy variables 
for each branch in order to decompose the deterrence effect 
with respect to the services. Using the new model, we first 
use the initial data files, including males and females 
(enlisted    only,     restricted    to     ages     17-49).     Since     this 
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thesis focuses on the Navy, in order to conserve space only 
the results for the Navy are displayed. 
Table 16 shows the results for Navy personnel of the 
logit coefficients and the marginal effects for the merged 
1979/80 data file. Coefficient estimates from logistic 
specifications of the probability of using any illicit drug 
in the past year and in the past month are recorded in 
Appendix J. The results indicate that prior to the program 
implementation, Navy members throughout all age groups were 
significantly more likely to have used drugs within the 
last year. With respect to past month drug participation, . 
however, Navy personnel were about 5 percentage points less 
likely than civilians to use drugs. 
Ages Ages Ages 
17 - 49 17 - 34 17 - 25 
(Navy) (Navy) (Navy) 
Past Year 0.2074 0.261 0.3887 
Participation (0.0568)3 (0.0581) (0.0648) 
[4.653]b [6.379] [9.651] 
{0.3174}c {0.3955} {0.4815} 
Past Month -0.3419 -0.2995 -0.2166 
Participation (0.0618) (0.0627) (0.0679) 
[-5.248] [-5.615] [-4.753] 
(0.2169) {0.2793} {0.34 98} 
N 17,266 14,703 10,495 
Notes:     Based on merged 1979 NHSDA / 1980 DODWWS file 
"  Standard errors are reported in parenthesis 
b
 Marginal effects in brackets (in percentage points) 
c
 Baseline predicted probability for civilians 
Table 16. Logit Estimates of Military Coefficient in Drug 
Participation Models, 1979 and 1980 Data, Restricted 
Samples, by Branches. 
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The military-civilian differences for 1985 are shown 
in Table 17. Coefficient estimates from logistic 
specifications of the probability of using any illicit drug 
in the past year and in the past month are recorded in 
Appendix K. In 1985 Navy service members in all age groups 
were significantly less likely to use drugs within the last 
year as well as in the past month. For all ages, the past 
year drug usage rate for military members was 4.653 
percentage points lower than in 1979/80. This yields a 
difference-in-difference of -22.763 percentage points. 
Ages Ages Ages 
17 - 49 17 - 34 17 - 25 
(Navy) (Navy) (Navy) 
Past Year -1.5191 -1.434 -1.0989 
Participation (0.0813)a (0.0839) (0.1053) 
[-18.11]b [-22.823] [-21.287] 
{0.2487}c {0.3358} {0.3862} 
Past Month -1.3336 -1.2503 -0.8551 
Participation (0.0944) (0.0972) (0.1211) 
[-11.181] [-14.394] [-12.227] 
{0.1594} {0.2178} {0.2427} 
N 17,316 12,399 6,145 
Notes:   Based on merged 1985 NHSDA and DODWWS file 
a
 Standard errors are reported in parenthesis 
b
 Marginal effects in brackets (in percentage points) 
c
 Baseline predicted probability for civilians 
Table 17. Logit Estimates of Military Coefficient in Drug 
Participation Models, 1985 Data, Restricted Samples, by 
Branches. 
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The drug use rate for past month participation for 
military personnel for the same age group was 11.181 
percentage points lower in 1985. This yields a difference- 
in-difference of -5.933 percentage points. Between 1980 and 
1985 the policy seems to have had the desired (positive) 
effect on the illicit use of drugs among Navy members. 
Again, we applied the model to the merged 1995 
NHSDA/DODWWS data file. Coefficient estimates from logistic 
specifications of the probability of using any illicit drug 
in the past year and in the past month are recorded in 
Appendix L. As shown in Table 18, estimates for the Navy 
indicate that its work force is less likely to have used 
drugs within the past year, ranging from a difference of - 
9.763 percentage points (ages 17-49) to as high as -12.884 
percentage points (ages 17-25). Similarly, the overall 
(column 1) past month drug participation rate among Navy 
personnel is 6.02 percentage points lower than for their 
civilian counterparts. 
Comparing the 1995 findings to 1979/80 show a 
difference-in-difference of -14.416 percentage points for 
17-49 year olds in past year participation. The past month 
participation comparison for the same age group indicates a 
difference-in-difference of only -0.78 percentage points. 
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This suggests that the deterrence effect has not changed 
since 1985. The difference-in-difference results are 
summarized  in Table  19. 
Ages Ages Ages 
17 - 49 17 - 34 17 - 25 
(Navy) (Navy) (Navy) 
Past Year -1.1429 -1.061 -0.8864 
Participation (0.0816)a (0.0868) (0.1018) 
[-9.763]b [-11.851] [-12.884] 
{0.1515}c {0.1966} {0.2491} 
Past Month -1.2604 -1.1838 -1.1052 
Participation (0.1111) (0.1180) (0.1426) 
[-6.0238] [-7.496] [-8.766] 
{0.0863} {0.1122} {0.1380} 
N 22,369 16,142 9,112 
Notes:   Based on merged 1995 NHSDA and DODWWS file 
a
  Standard errors  are  reported in parenthesis 
b
 Marginal  effects  in brackets   (in percentage points) 
0
 Baseline predicted probability  for  civilians 
Table   18.   Logit  Estimates   of  Military  Coefficient   in  Drug 
Participation Models,   1995   Data,   Restricted Samples,   by 
Branches. 
Difference -in - Difference (1979/80 - 1985) 
(in percentage points) 
Ages Ages Ages 
17 - 49 17 - 34 17 - 25 
(Navy) (Navy) (Navy) 
Past Year [-22.763] [-29.202] [-30.938] 
Participation 
Past Month [-5.933] [-8.779] [-7.474] 
Participation 
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Difference -in - Difference (1979/80 - 1995) 
(in percentage points) 
Ages Ages Ages 
17 - 49 17 - 34 17 - 25 
(Navy) (Navy) (Navy) 
Past Year [-14.416] [-18.23] [-22.535] 
Participation 
Past Month [-0.7758] [-1.881] [-4.013] 
Participation 
Difference - in - Difference (1985 - - 1995) 
(in percentage points) 
Ages Ages Ages 
17 - 49 17 - 34 17 - 25 
(Navy) (Navy) (Navy) 
Past Year [8.347] [10.972] [8.403] 
Participation 
Past Month [5.1572] [6.898] [3.461] 
Participation 
Note: Differences  calculated as  difference  in 
military-civilian  drug participation  rates 
between two  years. 
Source:   uses  coefficients  from Tables   16-18   in text. 
Table  19.   Difference-in-Difference Analysis  Drug 
Participation Models,   Restricted Samples,   by Branches. 
4.        Results  for Male Navy Personnel 
At this point, for the previously described reasons, 
we further restricted the samples to Navy males only. 
Coefficient estimates from logistic specifications of the 
probability of using any illicit drug in the past year and 
in    the   past   month   are    recorded   in   Appendix   M.    Estimating 
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the model for the 1979/80 data file resulted in the 
findings displayed in Table 20. Columns 1 through 3 show 
that males in the Navy were significantly more likely to 
have participated in past year drug use. Especially males, 
aged 17-25 years, were about 8.2 percentage points more 
likely then their civilian counterparts. The past month 
participation findings, however, show that male Navy 
personnel throughout all age groups were roughly 7 
percentage points less likely to have used drugs within the 
30 days. 
Ages Ages Ages 
17 - 49 17 - 34 17 - 25 
(Navy) (Navy) (Navy) 
Past ':'?■;: 0.1175 0.188 0.3357 
(0.0675)a (0.0693) (0.0775) 
[2.725]b [4.656] [8.242] 
{0.3521}c {0.4368} {0.5214} 
Past Ktr.tr. -0.4646 -0.4077 -0.3082 
Participat lor. (0.0703) (0.0716) (0.0782) 
[-7.712] [-8.161] [-7.066] 
{0.2513} {0.3200} {0.3933} 
N 13,723 11,730 8,284 
Notes:   Based on merged 1979 NHSDA / 1980 DODWWS file 
°  Standard errors are reported in parenthesis 
b
 Marginal effects in brackets (in percentage points) 
c
 Baseline predicted probability for civilians 
Table 20. Logit Estimates of Military Coefficient in Drug 
Participation Models, 1979 and 1980 Data, Restricted 
Samples, Navy Males Only. 
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Table 21 summarizes the impact of the drug prevention 
program in 1985. Coefficient estimates from logistic 
specifications of the probability of using any illicit drug 
in the past year and in the past month are recorded in 
Appendix N. The past year participation rate for the male 
Navy population (column 1) is 18.713 percentage points 
lower. Compared to 1979/80 this yields a difference-in- 
difference of -21.438 percentage points. 17-25 year old 
military members are 21.256 percentage points less like to 
have used drugs over the past year, resulting in a 
difference-in-difference of -29.498 percentage points. The 
past month participation findings show that male Navy 
personnel are significantly less likely to have used drugs 
within the last 30 days, ranging from -11.5 percentage 
points (column 1) to -16.1 percentage points (column 2). 
Ages Ages Ages 
17 - 49 17 - 34 17 - 25 
(Navy) (Navy) (Navy) 
Past Year -1.5539 -1.445 -1.0446 
Participation (0.0915)3 (0.0947) (0.1207) 
[-18.713]b [-24.684] [-21.256] 
{0.2544}c {0.3628} {0.4072} 
Past Month -1.3649 -1.2716 -0.8369 
Participation (0.1050) (0.1084) (0.1373) 
[-11.583] [-16.104] [-12.864] 
{0.1633} {0.2440} {0.2617} 
N 13,849 9,309 4,537 
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Notes:        Based on merged  1985 NHSDA and DODWWS   file 
a
  Standard errors  are  reported in parenthesis 
b
 Marginal  effects  in brackets   (in percentage points) 
c
 Baseline predicted probability  for  civilians 
Table  21.   Logit  Estimates  of Military  Coefficient   in  Drug 
Participation Models,   1985  Data,   Restricted Samples,   Navy 
Males  Only. 
If we compare the 1995 findings, shown in Table 22, to 
those of the pre-implementation period (1979/80), we find 
that on the one side that the difference-in-difference for 
past year drug use rate changed significantly, ranging from 
-13.89 percentage points (for 17-49 year olds) to -23.568 
percentage points (for 17-25 year olds) . On the other side, 
the past month participation rate only changed 
significantly for 17-25 year olds (roughly 4 percentage 
points). For ages 17-34 the difference-in-difference 
changed only slightly by 1.8 percentage points. For the 
whole male Navy sample, however, the military-civilian drug 
use difference for past month participation almost stayed 
at its level of 1979/80 (+0.283 percentage points). 
Coefficient estimates from logistic specifications of the 
probability of using any illicit drug in the past year and 
in the past month are recorded in Appendix 0. 
The  complete  difference-in-difference  findings  are 
displayed in Table 23. It is noteworthy that the deterrence 
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effect obtained for the full sample in Table 19 was altered 
very little by restricting the samples to Navy males only. 
Deterrence effect estimates for past year participation for 
17-49 year olds (see Table 19) is -14.416 percentage points 
for the Navy (males and females) model (1979/80-1995), for 
male Navy personnel model the estimated deterrence effect 
is -13.89 percentage points (see Table 23), a difference of 
Ages Ages Ages 
17 - 49 17 - 34 17 - 25 
(Navy) (Navy) (Navy) 
Past Year -1.2126 -1.130 -0.9782 
Participation (0.0963)a (0.1031) (0.1242) 
[-11.165]b [-14.446] [-15.326] 
{0.1685}c {0.2345} {0.2819} 
Past Month -1.3922 -1.3239 -1.2733 
Participation (0.1301) (0.1397) (0.1736) 
[-7.429] [-9.918] [-11.041] 
{0.1016} {0.1411} {0.1616} 
N 14,068 9,617 5,673 
Notes:   Based on merged 1995 NHSDA and DODWWS file 
a
 Standard errors are reported in parenthesis 
b
 Marginal effects in brackets (in percentage points) 
c
 Baseline predicted probability for civilians 
Table 22. Logit Estimates of Military Coefficient in Drug 
Participation Models, 1995 Data, Restricted Samples, Navy 
Males Only. 
only 0.526 percentage points. The deterrence effect 
estimates for past month participation for 17-49 year olds 
(see Table 19) is -0.7758 percentage points for the Navy 
(males and females) model (1979/80-1995), for the 
restricted to male Navy model the estimated deterrence 
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effect    is    0.283    percentage    points,    a    difference    of    only 
1.0588  percentage points. 
Difference -in - Difference (1979/80 ■ - 1985) 
(in percentage points) 
Ages Ages Ages 
17 - 49 17 - 34 17 - 25 
(Navy) (Navy) (Navy) 
Past Year [-21.438] [-29.34] [-29.498] 
Participation 
Past Month [-3.871] [-7.943] [-5.798] 
Participation 
Difference -in - Difference (1979/80 • - 1995) 
(in percentage points) 
Ages Ages Ages 
17 - 49 17 - 34 17 - 25 
(Navy) (Navy) (Navy) 
Past Year [-13.89] [-19.102] [-23.568] 
Participation 
Past Month [0.283] [-1.757] [-3.975] 
Participation 
Difference - in - Difference (1985 - - 1995) 
(in percentage points) 
Ages Ages Ages 
17 - 49 17 - 34 17 - 25 
(Navy) (Navy) (Navy) 
Past Year [7.548] [10.238] [5.93] 
Participation 
Past Month [4.154] [6.186] [1.823] 
Participation 
Note: Differences  calculated as  difference  in 
military-civilian drug participation  rates 
between two  years. 
Source:    uses   coefficients   from   Tables   20-22   in 
text. 
Table  23.   Difference-in-Difference Analysis  Drug 
Participation Models,   Restricted Samples,   Navy Males  Only. 
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D.   SUMMARY 
This chapter has shown that the U.S. military's strict 
"zero tolerance" policy had a positive effect in terms of 
reducing the illicit use of nonmedical drugs among military 
members between 1979/80 and 1985. All findings clearly 
indicate that both past year as well as past month drug 
participation decreased between the pre- and post- 
implementation periods. Furthermore, all findings show that 
the policy had the greatest impact on the youngest age 
groups of the military, especially for 17-25 year olds. 
Comparison of the findings from 1985 to the 1995 uniformly 
show, however, that the initial deterrence effect, caused 
by the policy and the possible uncertainty among military 
members about its consequences/impacts, significantly 
decreased over time. This is true whether past year or past 
month participation measures are used. 
In addition, if we compare the pre-implementation 
findings (1979/80) to those of 1995, we find two main 
results in all models. First, all findings show a positive 
deterrence effect of the policy on past year participation, 
ranging from as low as -11.88 percentage points (military 
combined, males only, ages 17-49) to as high as -23.568 
percentage points (Navy, males only, ages 17-25). Second, 
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the findings for past month participation show a positive 
deterrence effect for 17-25 year olds ranging from -1 
percentage point (military combined, males only) to as high 
as -4 percentage points (Navy, males only). For the entire 
Navy sample, all models show almost no change in past month 
participation. The findings range from an increase of 0.216 
percentage points (restricted sample, males and females, 
ages 17-49) to 1.963 percentage points (males only, ages 
17-4 9). Only the combined sample (males and females) broken 
down by services show an insignificant decrease of -0.78 
percentage points, which indicates that the deterrence 
effect has remained relatively constant over time. 
Since this thesis focuses on the deterrence effect for 
the Navy, we use the findings of the Navy-only models. For 
the calculations in the following chapters, however, we use 
the results from the most recent deterrence effect (1979/80 
compared to 1995). Table 24 summarizes the findings from 
Table 19 and Table 23, focusing on the deterrence effect 
for 1995. 
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Model: By Branches, Males and Females 
Difference - in - Difference (1979/80 - - 1995) 
(in percent« ige points) 
Ages Ages Ages 
17 - 49 17 - 34 17 - 25 
(Navy) (Navy) (Navy) 
Past Year [-14.416] [-18.23] [-22.535] 
Participation 
Past Month [-0.7758] [-1.881] [-4.013] 
Participation 
Model: By Branches , Males only 
1995) Difference -in - Difference (1979/80 - 
(in percentage points) 
Ages Ages Ages 
17 - 49 17 - 34 17 - 25 
(Navy) (Navy) (Navy) 
Past Year [-13.89] [-19.102] [-23.568] 
Past v~,-t- [0.283] [-1.757] [-3.975] 
Table 24. Summary Deterrence Effect 1979/80-1995. 
The size of the deterrence effect for those two- 
periods vary depending on which age groups and which drug 
use measure is used. It should be noted, however, that the 
findings for the past year participation are possibly 
biased because the DODWWS questionnaires do not take into 
account that, due to the long time lag the question covers, 
respondents may or may not have used drugs prior to their 
entry into the military. A respondent who answers the past 
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year participation question in October, may have joined the 
military in June. Hence, drug use for five months as a 
civilian would be attributed to the "zero tolerance" policy 
although the respondent has been in the military for only 
five months. The past month participation variable avoids 
this possible bias by not including recruits in the sample 
of questionnaires. 
The adjusted military-civilian differential in drug 
use in the three different periods is repeated in Table 25. 










+4.653 -18.11 -9.763 
Pst Month 
Participation 
-5.248 -11.181 -6.0238 
Notes:     In percentage points 
From Tables 16-18 
Table 25. Summary Deterrence Effect Ages 17-49, for Navy. 
Note that drug use rates in 1979/80, the pre-policy 
year, were similar in the two sectors, whereas use rates in 
the military were much lower in the two post-policy years. 
For the following chapter we treat the military-civilian 
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difference for 1995 (-9.76 percentage points) as the "true" 
deterrence effect for past year participation, since the 
drug use rate in 1979/80 was significantly higher in the 
military than for the civilians. For past month 
participation, however, the previously calculated 
deterrence effect of -0.78 percentage points (see Table 19 
and Table 24) are used. 
IV. THE COST OF A ZERO TOLERANCE POLICY: ESTIMATING 
THE REPLACEMENT COST OF DISCHARGED PERSONNEL 
A.   BACKGROUND 
The previous chapter of this thesis has estimated a 
positive deterrence effect resulting from the 
implementation and enforcement of the Navy's "zero 
tolerance" policy towards the nonmedical abuse of drugs 
among military personnel. Based on the main aim of the 
policy and the public perception towards drug abuse, the 
policy appears to have been successful. There was a drastic 
decrease of drug usage within the military after 
implementation of the zero tolerance policy in the early 
1980's. Despite the zero tolerance policy, however, the 
goal of zero usage has not been accomplished. However small 
it might be, there is still an unknown proportion of 
service members who use drugs, and only some percentage of 
those are detected via urinalysis. 
Even though both the deterrence and detection effects 
of the Navy's drug prevention policies are measurable and 
generate positive economic benefits, an important cost must 
also be evaluated - the replacement costs of those 
discharged from the Navy after testing positive. The goal 
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of this chapter is to quantify the replacement cost of 
those discharged from the Navy in FY99. 
Unfortunately, based on the military's unique 
structure in which lateral entry is almost impossible (see 
Figure 1) , a discharged person cannot be replaced in the 
same way a spare part for broken equipment is replaced. 
Depending on the rating and the years of service (YOS) , a 
detailer cannot replace the discharged person by hiring a 
similarly skilled and trained person in the civilian labor 
force. Replacing a person can only occur from the bottom 
upwards, i.e. by "hiring" a new military enlistee (see 
Figure 1) . Thus, replacement costs for military personnel 
who are discharged tend to be higher than for civilian 





Figure 1. Hierarchical Pyramid Structure of the Military. 
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Figure 2 shows, based on FY99 continuation rates for 
all Navy enlisted personnel, the cohort survival rate (left 
vertical  axis)  and the  resulting number of  accessions 
needed  (right vertical axis)  to replace one discharged 
military member by years of service (YOS) . As can be seen, 
the greater the YOS of the discharged person the more new 
entrants must be hired to ensure that at a certain point in 
time there will be a skilled and trained replacement for 
the  discharged  person.  This  clearly  indicates  that 
discharging a drug user generates fairly high replacement 
costs.  According to  Figure 2,  for example,  a military 
member who is discharged at 10 YOS requires about seven 
(6.89)  new accessions to ensure that one service member 
will survive to YOS 10. The lower the continuation rate in 
a given rating,  the higher the number of new accessions 
required to replace one discharged service member. 
B.   METHODOLOGY 
1.   Positive Test Takers Data Set 
As pointed out in a previous study by Borack and Mehay 
[Ref. 26], information on the paygrade, length of service 
(or  years  of  service,  YOS),  and  rating  of  discharged 
individuals are required to estimate replacement costs. The 
analysis requires information on individuals discharged by 
the Navy. A data set provided by the Defense Manpower Data 
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Figure 2. Cohort Survival Rate and Number of Accessions 
needed to Replace Leavers (All Navy Enlisted). 
Center (DMDC)[Ref. 27], contains the needed information on 
the 5,446 Navy personnel who were detected via urinalysis 
and discharged due to nonmedical drug use during FY99. 
Table 18 summarizes the socioeconomic characteristics of 
the discharged personnel. Appendix K provides the layout of 
the entire DMDC data set. 
As Table 26 shows, approximately 60% of the discharged 
personnel are white, 24% are black/African American, and 
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about 10% are Hispanic. Of the discharged Navy personnel, 
94% were males. Roughly 46% of all discharged personnel 
were between 17 and 20 years old and about 40% were between 
21 and 25 years old. A close look at the distribution of 
drug abuse with respect to grade (Paygroup) shows that over 
99% of all detected and discharged personnel were in 
paygrades El through E9, only 0.55% in the officer ranks. 
This justifies the methodology applied in the analysis of 
the deterrence effect in the previous chapter of deleting 
officers (and professionals in the civilian samples) in 
order to focus on the main group of potential drug users. 
In order to conserve space, the distribution of 
positive testers with respect to YOS was also grouped by 
enlistment-terms (e.g. first term with YOS 1-4). The data 
reveal that the highest incidence of nonmedical drug abuse 
occurred among first termers, those with one to four YOS 
(86.6%). Note that discharging those abusers rather than 
rehabilitating them exacerbates the current problem facing 
the Navy of attrition of first term personnel. As can be 
seen, drug use among military members decreases 
significantly after the first term of enlistment. 
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Variable    Characteristic  Frequency   Percentage 
Race/Ethnicity- 
Unknown 13 ■ 0.24 
White 3,246 59.61 
Black 1,330 24.43 
Hispanic 560 10.28 
American Indian 149 2.73 
Asian/Pacific 132 2.42 
Other 16 0.29 
Gender Male 
5,115 93.95 
Female 331 6.05 
Age 
Age 17-20 2,487 45.66 
Age 21-25 2,168 39.81 
Age 26-34 591 10.85 
Age 35-49 197 3.63 
Age 50-60 3 0.06 
Paygroup El - E9 5,416 
99.45 





YOS   1-4 4,716 86.6 
YOS   5-8 372 6.83 
YOS  9-12 128 2.35 
YOS 13-16 118 2.17 
YOS 17-20 88 1.62 
YOS 21-24 18 0.33 
YOS 25-28 6 0.11 
Notes:     Source: DMDC 
N = 5,446 
Table 26. Socioeconomic Characteristics of Navy Personnel 
Discharged in FY99 for Testing Positive for Drug Use. 
For these same reasons (described in Chapter III) and 
in order to be consistent, we deleted data on all officers 
from the data set. Table 27 summarizes the socioeconomic 
characteristics of the remaining positive drug testers. 
2.   Replacement Cost Per Person 
The study by Borack and Mehay attempted to approximate 
average replacement cost by using drug usage rates (by 
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Variable    Characteristic  Frequency   Percentage 
Race/Ethnicity 
Unknown 12 0.22 
White 3,219 59.44 
Black 1,329 24.54 
Hispanic 560 10.34 
American Indian 149 2.75 
Asian/Pacific 132 2.44 
Other 15 0.28 
Gender Male 5,095 94.07 
Female 321 5.93 
Age 
Age 17-20 2,487 45.92 
Age 21-25 2,167 40.01 
Age 26-34 581 10.73 
Age 35-49 180 3.32 





YOS   1-4 4,710 86.96 
YOS   5-8 365 6.74 
YOS  9-12 126 2.33 
YOS 13-16 113 2.09 
YOS 17-20 84 1.55 
YOS 21-24 15 0.28 
YOS 25-28 3 0.06 
Notes:     Source: DMDC 
N = 5,416 
Table 27. Socioeconomic Characteristics of Navy Personnel 
Discharged in FY99 for Testing Positive for Drug Use 
(Enlisted Only). 
paygrade) as reported in Bray et al. [Ref. 28]. Borack- 
Mehay applied the median years of service for each paygrade 
to the Yeoman (YN) rating to derive the average replacement 
cost. In contrast, this thesis attempts to determine the 
actual cost of replacing each individual discharged from 
the Navy in FY99. Unfortunately, replacement cost tables, 
which the Navy used to maintain, were not available at the 
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time of this thesis research. This thesis had to calculate 
all replacement costs for discharged personnel. This 
approach is diagrammed in Figure 3, and discussed in the 
next section. 
Figure 3 shows that two different methodologies are 
used to derive the cost figures. The first ("one-for-one") 
methodology assumes that discharged individuals can be 
replaced on a one-for-one basis. The second ("agriculture 
cost") approach recognizes the Navy's internal labor market 
and the necessity to hire several new entrants to ensure 
that one person survives and is available to replace those 
who separate with several years of service. Both 
methodologies are described in greater detail below. 
3. Cost of Manpower Estimating Tool (COMET) 
COMET, which is available online, is a PC-based 
(Windows95®) tool that provides estimates of Operating and 
Support (O&S) cost for active duty, reserves, and civilian 
components of Navy manpower. Analysts can use this 
information to make decisions about various manpower-to- 
manpower or manpower-to-hardware tradeoffs. This thesis 
focuses on active duty Navy personnel only, thus "Active 
Duty Tutorial" in COMET was used. 
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Figure 3. Methodology for Replacement Cost Calculations. 
At the heart of COMET'S active duty manpower cost 
methodology is the identification of "variable indirect" 
costs, associated with changes in end strength (covering 
FYs 1980-1996). This concept includes other "documented" 
manpower "support" costs to recruit, train, locate and 
support the "sea duty" oriented (ships, squadrons) force, 
as that force varied from FYs 80-89 (buildup) through FYs 
90-96 (draw down). 
The continuing development of the COMET model is a 
result of a five-year research project (started in 1996), 
jointly undertaken by the Naval Center for Cost Analysis 
(NCCA) and Dr. Henry L. Eskew (then with the Center for 
Naval Analyses CNA) . Eskew's trilogy of "Cost Of A Sailor" 
(COAS)  studies  form the basis for his  change  in "end 
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strength"-driven   variable   indirect   manpower   cost 
methodology. 
Eskew applied statistical time-series regression to 
establish a linear relationship between the change in the 
number of support personnel billets and the change in the 
number of operational billets in the fleet. His findings 
outlined a method to capture variable indirect personnel 
costs associated with operational billets in the fleet. 
[Ref. 29] The COMET model was created in order to provide a 
software tool that would enable the user to more accurately 
estimate the total, marginal, and average costs of filling 
the Navy's active billets. COMET includes econometric and 
operational research simulation models, which can be used 
to explore the effects of various personnel policies on 
manpower costs. COMET, a relatively new costing tool to the 
Navy,  deals  exclusively  with  the  marginal  costs  of 
personnel,   which  is  especially  useful   for  studies 
concerning hardware versus manpower tradeoffs. [Ref. 29] 
COMET provides cost calculations by paygrade, officer 
community and enlisted specialty, and includes items that 
are funded by Military Personnel, Navy (MPN) accounts (such. 
as  basic  pay,   allowances,   retirement  accrual,   FICA 
contributions, and PCS costs). Furthermore, COMET provides 
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variable indirect personnel costs, funded through a mix of 
MPN and Operation and Maintenance, and Navy (OMN), such as 
training and base operational support. Finally, it also 
includes other non-Navy costs, such as TRICARE (funded by 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) and 
Montgomery GI Bill (funded by the Veterans Administration) 
[Ref. 30]. Support for the COMET model is provided by the 
prime contractor, SAG Corporation (http://www.sagcorp.com), 
based in Falls Church, Virginia. 
4.   Ratings 
The database of the "Active Component" in COMET is 
divided by enlisted and officer components. Once the user 
chooses a database, COMET allows the user to change the FY 
dollar value for which the costs are calculated. The data 
set used for this thesis is based on FY99. The advantage in 
using the FY99 DMDC data set in combination with COMET is 
that the DMDC data set contains the specific rating for ' 
each discharged individual. The rating of each particular 
individual can be chosen within COMET from a menu list, 
which is shown in Figure 4. COMET calculates the manpower 
costs for each Navy rating. There were 88 different 
enlisted ratings extracted from the data file. 
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Figure 5 shows one of the menus accessible in COMET, 
(shown here for enlisted cost calculations), from which the 
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Figure 4.   COMET Rating Menu. 
—HOT c 
5296.98      6098. 
0.00 0. 
2988.00      2988. 




Di COMET (Active Component}.. 
;£il«  fiata; Ed*; J.CC   Hefe. 
, Select/Deselect Enlisted Cost Elements 
Tfc*T1;FfcN 
Direct Cost Variable Indirect Cost 
I- use NAVCQMPT rates l< RecruWng 
F/ ^tätary GomponsaSori 
V? Enlistment Bonus 
W Training   • 
|7 ReenSstment Bonus 1<< Medical Support 
f? PCS Costs 
f* Separation Costs W IndhflduaTs Account 
|7 Retired Pay Accrual 
J? Special Pay»; 
1? Base Support 
l* Other Benefit* W Administrative Activities 
IFG.I.BB                                 i j n? Medical Support 
" checked ken» will be included n final costs 
OK. 
[Status" '.   """" 
Source: COMET  "Active  Duty Component Tutorial" NCCA 
'fu/mj   "~ ■ iäpeAM; '""""~T~; 
(http://www.ncca.navy.mil/comet/download.htm) 
Figure 5. COMET Cost Element Menu. 
According to BUPERS [Ref. 31], the Navy calculates the 
replacement cost of a person by allocating the training 
costs of student time and a proportion of some instructor 
time and materials.  Following BUPERS'  methodology,  only 
training and recruiting costs  (variable indirect costs) 
were included in the cost calculations in this thesis. One 
limitation  of  COMET,  however,  is  that  the  calculated 
training  and  recruiting  costs  vary  by  rating  but  are 
constant for all paygrades. For example, the training and 
recruiting costs for an El are the same as to that for an 
E9. This is a potential weakness of COMET because it can be 
assumed that  an  E9  receives  additional  training  (e.g. 
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refresher and/or update) during his/her career. This tends 
to bias the estimated replacement costs downward. For each 
rating of discharged personnel, the replacement cost for 
the individual (consisting of MPN and OMN training and 
recruiting costs) was calculated. 
For some ratings COMET did not provide specific costs. 
Table 28 lists the ratings that are not included in COMET. 
Rating Description 
AN Airman 
DN Dental man 
FN Fireman 
HN Hospital corpsman 
SN Seaman 
AR Airman - Recruit 
DR Dental man - Recruit 
FR Fireman - Recruit 
HR Hospital corpsman - Recruit 
SR Seaman - Recruit 
AA Airman - Apprentice 
DA Dental man - Apprentice 
FA Fireman - Apprentice 
HA Hospital corpsman - Apprentice 
SA Seaman - Apprentice 
Table 28. Adjusted Ratings 
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However, the model provides average costs for an "All 
Navy" category (enlisted or officer) . Thus, the "All Navy" 
cost figure was applied to the following ratings: Hospital 
Corpsman (HN), Airman (AN), Seaman (SN), Fireman (FN), and 
Dentalman  (DN).  For  recruits  and  apprentices,  cost 
calculations  were  based  on  the  training  level  of  the 
individual,  based  on  whether  the  individual  completed 
bootcamp or A-School.  This information was provided by 
BUPERS  (N793M)  for  each  of  these  ratings.  [Ref.  32] 
Fortunately, the FY99 data set contained enough information 
in order to identify whether a discharged person completed 
"bootcamp-only" or "A-School". 
5.   Continuation  Rates /Number  of  New  Accessions 
Needed to Replace Dischargees 
Based on the previously described structure of the 
military  (Figure  1),  the  assumption that  a  discharged 
person can easily be replaced in every rating at any point 
of time may be unrealistic. As shown in Figure 1 and Figure 
2,  the Navy can only replace somebody from the "grown" 
inventory, which over time, decreases. The magnitude of the 
"inventory decay" depends on specific ratings. The later 
(with respect to YOS)  a person is discharged, the more 
severe the replacement problem becomes. Continuation rates, 
cohort survival rates, and the resulting number of required 
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new accessions vary significantly over the spectrum of 
ratings. In this thesis a "one-for-one" replacement was 
applied in order to obtain a lower-bound cost estimate. The 
second methodology of computing the replacement cost per 
person is based on the number of new accessions that are 
necessary in order to ensure that one person "survives" to 
a given YOS and provides an upper-bound cost estimate. The 
question that has to be answered is how many people in a 
given rating, after accounting for the discharged person's 
YOS, must be accessed in order to ensure that one person in 
that particular rating will be available at the YOS of the 
discharged person. This is also called "agriculture" costs, 
which is a primary component of replacement cost. 
In order to apply this second methodology to the 
discharges in FY99, actual continuation rates for each of 
the represented ratings, broken down by YOS, are necessary. 
These rates were calculated and provided for this thesis by 
a Navy contractor, DynMeridian. [Ref. 33] 
Using the above mentioned continuation rates, the 
cohort survival rates for each rating, broken down by YOS, 
can be calculated as in equation (1): 
SM Tip* (1) 
i=l 
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where:    pjt = continuation rate for YOS t in rating j. 
Sjt = survival rate for YOS t in rating j. 
t = 1,..., 30 YOS. 
Using these survival rates for the particular rating, 
the necessary number of accessions to replace one person, 
given his/her YOS, is computed as in equation (2): 
1 1 
a, =—       or       a,, =■ 
UP» 
(=1 
where:    a-jt = number of necessary accessions at the 
entry point for rating j with "goal-YOS" t. 
Pjt = continuation rate for YOS t in rating j. 
Sjt = survival rate for YOS t in rating j. 
t = 1,..., 30 YOS. 
Table 29 shows an example of actual continuation rates 
for one rating, Boatswain's Mate, Fuel (ABF), for YOS 1-24. 
Applying equation (1) yields the cohort survival rate in 
column 2. Inverting the cohort survival rate, as shown in 
^equation (2), yields the required accessions in column 3. 
Figure 6 graphs the findings from Table 29. 
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ABF 








1 0.8553 0.8553 1.17 
2 0.9135 0.7813 1.28 
3 0.8288 0.6475 1.54 
4 0.4262 0.2760 3.62 
5 0.6602 0.1822 5.49 
6 0.9385 0.1710 5.85 
7 0.8621 0.1474 6.78 
8 0.7791 0.1148 8.71 
9 0.8776 0.1008 9.92 
10 0.7846 0.0791 12.65 
11 0.9275 0.0733 13.63 
12 0.9592 0.0704 14.21 
13 0.9592 0.0675 14.82 
14 0.9474 0.0639 15.64 
15 1.0000 0.0639 15.64 
16 0.9434 0.0603 16.58 
17 0.9714 0.0586 17.07 
18 1.0000 0.0586 17.07 
19 0.9545 0.0559 17.88 
20 0.4167 0.0233 42.92 
21 0.7273 0.0169 59.01 
22 0.6000 0.0102 98.35 
23 0.4000 0.0041 245.87 
24 0.3333 0.0014 737.62 
Source:  DynMeridian Corporation 
Table 29. Example Cohort Survival Rate. 
Table 30 shows for example that 12.6 accessions are 
required to ensure that one ABF is available at YOS 10. 
This is due to the fact that nearly 60% of the cohort 
leaves the Navy at the end of YOS 4, and nearly 80% have 
separated by YOS 10. These low continuation rates (high 
separation rates) yield a low survival rate to YOS 10 
(0.0791).  Stated differently,  of every 12 new recruits 
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brought into this rating, only 1 is still serving in the 
Navy 10 years later. 
As can be seen in both Figure 6 and Table 30 some 
adjustments had to be made in order to keep the number of 
required accessions within reasonable bounds. First, as can 
be seen, since the U.S. military system is based on an 
average upper enlistment period of 20 YOS, at which service 
members are eligible for retirement benefits, the vast 
majority of members leave the military at 20 years. Thus, 
at YOS 20, the cohort survival rate generally drops to a 
level at which the resulting number of required new 
accessions "explodes" almost exponentially. These numbers 
are excessive because the Navy personnel system is geared 
to 20-year careers. Even though some personnel stay beyond 
20 years, there is no explicit policy of replacing people 
who leave after YOS 20. 
In Table 30 for example (for a Boatswain's Mate, 
Fuel), the number of required accessions increases from 
17.88 at the end of YOS 19 to almost 43 accessions at the 
end of YOS 20, and grows to 737.63 accessions at the end of 
YOS 24. Since the military does keep a proportion of 
service members with more than 20 YOS this indicates that 
there is some demand for people with these service lengths. 
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Therefore, we could not simply ignore the accessions demand 
for personnel who leave after 20 YOS. 
*— Survival % -Accessions 
YOS 
Figure 6. Adjusted Rating (Boatswain's Mate, Fuel (ABF)). 
After examining all necessary accessions for 
individuals in the FY99 data, the decision was made to 
assign a maximum of 30 accessions per rating. Since the 
military enlistment system is based on 20 YOS, individuals 
with more than 20 YOS and 30 necessary accessions, were 
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assigned an average cohort survival rate from the "All 
Navy" estimate for 20 YOS. This solved the problem in all 
cases of more than 20 YOS and more than 30 accessions. 
Applying this adjustment to the calculation resulted in a 
drop of accessions, depending on the YOS, to below 25. 
Ratings with fewer than 20 YOS but more than 30 accessions, 
mainly in the "low-skill" ratings with more than two YOS, 
were also adjusted by assigning an average cohort survival 
rate ("All Navy") for the corresponding YOS. 
C.   REPLACEMENT COST CALCULATIONS 
Based on the ratings represented among the 5,416 
enlisted Navy personnel discharged in FY99, the training 
and recruiting costs per person were calculated using COMET 
for each individual. For ratings not represented in COMET 
(Airman, Oentalman, Fireman, Hospital Corpsman, and 
Seaman), the "All Navy" average replacement cost were used. 
The replacement costs for recruits and apprentices were 
based on the individual's training level — bootcamp or A- 
School — and based on cost data from BUPERS. Table 22 
lists the replacement costs for the enlisted ratings 
represented in COMET. The costs range from a low of $7,151 
(e.g. Navy Counselor) to a high of $46,067 for an 




(FY 1999) Rating Title 
AB Aviation Boatswain's Mate $   12,015.87 
ABE Aviation BM - Launching and Recovery $   13,287.17 
ABF Aviation BM - Fuels $   13,425.83 
ABH Aviation BM - Aircraft Handling $   16,880.59 
AC Air Traffic Controller $   15,972.43 
AD Aviation Machinist's Mate $   16,880.59 
AE Aviation Electrician's Mate $   23,467.57 
AF Aviation Maintenanceman (Comp Rating) $   12,015.87 
AG Aerographer's Mate $   15,055.13 
AK Aviation Storekeeper $   15,053.98 
AM Aviation Structural Mechanic $    7,151.16 
AME Aviation Struct Mech - Safety Equip $   16,880.59 
AMH Aviation Struct Mech - Hydr Mech $   16,880.59 
AMS Aviation Struct Mech - Structures $   16,880.59 
AO Aviation Ordnanceman $   16,880.59 
AS Aviation Support Equipment Technician $   16,880.59 
AT Aviation Electronics Technician $   18,409.35 
AV Aviation Avionics Technician (Comp Rating) $   12,015.87 
AW Aviation ASW Operator $   16,203.29 
AZ Aviation Maintenance Administrationman $   14,826.00 
BM Boatswain's Mate $   16,880.59 
BT Boilerman N.A. 
BU Builder $    9,685.23 
CE Construction Electrician $   11,532.05 
CM Construction Mechanic $   10,473.89 
CTA Cryptologic Technician (Administrative) $   15,349.93 
CTI Cryptologic Technician (Interpretative) $   12,015.88 
CTM Cryptologic Technician (Maintenance) $   22,569.89 
CTO Cryptologic Technician (Communications) $   15,928.48 
CTR Cryptologic Technician (Collection) $   13,527.73 
CTT Cryptologic Technician (Technical) $   17,404.68 
CU Constructionman (Comp Rating) $    7,151.16 
DC Damage Control $   13,632.49 
DIV Diver (EMC) $    7,151.16 
DK Disbursing Clerk $   14,836.39 




(FY 1999) Rating Title 
DP Data Processing Technician $   12,015.87 
DS Data Systems Technician $   12,015.87 
DT Dental Technician $   12,015.87 
EA Engineering Aid $    9,977.44 
EM Electrician's Mate $   19,523.88 
EMNUCSS Electrician's Mate Sub Nuc (EMC) $   46,066.99 
EMNUCSW Electrician's Mate Surf Nuc (EMC) $   40,430.25 
EMSW Electrician's Mate Surf (EMC) $   41,204.18 
EN Engineman $   19,878.89 
ENAUX Engineman, Auxiliaries (EMC) $   22,428.86 
ENMN Engineman, Main Propulsion (EMC) $   22,428.86 
EO Equipment Operator $    9,615.32 
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal $    7,151.16 
EQ Equipmentman (Comp Rating) $    7,151.16 
ET Electronics Technician $   18,409.35 
ETNUCSS Electronics Technician, Sub Nuc (EMC) $   44,210.76 
ETNUCSW Electronics Technician, Surf Nuc (EMC) $   38,574.05 
ETSS Electronics Technician, Sub (EMC) $   23,621.93 
ETSW Electronics Technician, Surf (EMC) $    7,151.17 
EW Electronic Warfare Technician $   18,399.23 
FC Fire Controlman $   25,972.85 
FT Fire Control Technician (Comp Rating) $   18,757.21 
FTG Fire Control Tech - Gun N.A. 
GM Gunner's Mate $   12,091.52 
GMG Gunner's Mate - Guns $   23,274.06 
GMM Gunner's Mate - Missile $   13,544.63 
GS Gas Turbine Systems Technician $   12,015.88 
GSE Gas Turbine - Electrical $   29,475.34 
GSM Gas Turbine - Mechanical $   26,103.98 
HM Hospital Corpsman $   12,015.88 
HMDIV Medical Deep Sea Dive Tech (EMC) $    7,151.16 
HMNUC Nuclear Medicine Tech (EMC) $    7,151.16 
HMSEAL Special Operations Tech (EMC) $    7,151.16 
HMSUB Independent Duty Corpsman, Sub (EMC) $   13,790.07 
HMSURF Independent Duty Corpsman, Surf (EMC) $    7,151.16 
HT Hull Maintenance Technician $   19,807.38 
IC Interior Comm Electrician $   20,408.46 
ICSS Interior Comm Electrician, Sub (EMC) $   10,149.83 
IM Instrumentman $   21,963.75 
IS Intelligence Specialist $   17,845.79 
JO Journalist $   16,880.59 
LI Lithographer $   16,880.59 
LN Legalman $   16,880.59 
MA faster-At-Arms $    9,353.59 




(FY 1999) Rating Title 
MM Machinist's Mate $   13,691.86 
MMNUCSS Machinist's Mate, Sub Nuc (EMC) $   25,881.41 
MMNUCSW Machinist's Mate, Surf Nuc (EMC) $   20,244.67 
MMSS Machinist's Mate, Sub (EMC) $   10,020.20 
MN Mineman $   22,960.74 
MR Machinery Repairman $   15,308.83 
MS Mess Management Specialist $   13,202.37 
MSSS Mess Management Specialist, Sub (EMC) $   10,214.26 
MT Missile Technician $   19,187.36 
MU Musician $   16,871.33 
NC Navy Counselor $    7,151.16 
OM Opticalman $   29,707.65 
OS Operations Specialist $  23,257.16 
. OT Ocean Systems Technician (Comp Rating) $   12,015.87 
OTA Ocean Systems Technician, Anal $   13,527.73 
OTM Ocean Systems Technician, Maint $   13,544.63 
PC Postal Clerk $   13,005.85 
PH Photographer's Mate $   16,880.59 
PM Patternmaker $   12,015.87 
PN Fersor.nelman $   14,586.38 
PR .-.ircrew Survival Equipmentman $   16,880.59 
QM    iCuarterr.aster $   14,524.32 
$    9,027.78 
RM    |?.aoiomar. $   16,104.60 
RMSS Raa-cr.ar., Sub (EMC) $   11,604.60 
RP r.eligio-s Program $   13,793.00 
SEAL Seal, Special Warfare (EMC) $    7,151.16 
SH Ship's Serviceman $   14,168.38 
SK Storekeeper $   14,950.15 
SKSS Storekeeper, Sub (EMC) $    9,027.78 
SM Signalman $   14,263.95 
STG Sonar Technician - Surface $   15,434.16 
STS Sonar Technician - Submarine $   18,674.72 
SW Steelworker $    9,466.54 
TM Torpedoman's Mate $   14,471.24 
TMSS rorpedoman's Mate, Sub (EMC) $   11,483.13 
ÜT ütilitiesman $   10,167.00 ' 




(FY 1999) Rating Title 
YN Yeoman $   14,500.78 
YNSS Yeoman, Sub (EMC) $    9,027.78 
Source:       COMET "Active Duty Component Tutorial" NCCA 
(http://www.ncca.navy.mil/comet/download.htm) 
N.A. = not available in COMET. 
Table 30. Replacement Costs Enlisted (FY99 dollars). 
Table 31 shows the average "All Navy" replacement 
costs  for  the  enlisted  occupations that  were  not 
specifically represented in COMET. The average for these 
non-rated occupations was $17,344. 
Cost ($) 
(FY 1999) Rating Title 
HN Hospitalman $ 17,344.71 
AN Airman $ 17,344.71 
SN Seaman $ 17,344.71 
FN Fireman $ 17,344.71 
DN Dentalman $ 17,344.71 
Source: COMET "Active Duty Component Tutorial" NCCA 
(http://www.ncca.navy.mil/comet/download.htm) 
Table 31. Replacement Costs Enlisted (Average). 
Table 32 summarizes the replacement costs for recruits 
and apprentices. As can be seen, the replacement costs 
.differ significantly between a recruit/apprentice who is 
discharged from bootcamp ($6,858) and one who is detected 
and discharged from A-School ($21,950). 
Cost ($) 
(FY 1999) 
Rating Title Bootcamp only Bootcamp + A-School 
AR Airman - Recruit $        6,858.00 $ 21,950.00 
DR Dentalman - Recruit $         6,858.00 $ 21,950.00 
FR Fireman - Recruit $         6,858.00 $ 21,950.00 
HR Hospitalman - Recruit $         6,858.00 $ 21,950.00 
SR Seaman - Recruit $         6,858.00 $ 21,950.00 
Cost ($) 
(FY 1999) 
Rating Title Bootcamp only Bootcamp + A-School 
AA Airman - Apprentice $        6,858.00 $ 21,950.00 
DA Dentalman - Apprentice $         6,858.00 $ 21,950.00 
FA Fireman - Apprentice $         6,858.00 $ 21,950.00 
HA Hospitalman - Apprentice $        6,858.00 $ 21,950.00 
SA Seaman - Apprentice $         6,858.00 $ 21,950.00 
Source: BOPERS N793M 
Table 32. Replacement Costs Recruits/Apprentice. 
In order to calculate replacement costs, two 
assumptions/methodologies were pursued. Using a "one-for- 
one" basis, the total replacement cost for the discharged 
Navy personnel in FY99 is the sum of the replacement cost 
per person (consisting of training and recruiting costs 
from Table 28 to Table 32) of the 5,416 Navy personnel. The 
"agriculture cost" basis accounts for rating-specific 
continuation rates. Hence the replacement cost under the 
"agriculture cost methodology" is the sum of the rating- 
specific replacement cost per person times the number of 
required accessions. 
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ünder the assumption that ' discharged personnel are 
replaced on a "one-for-one" basis, the total cost of the 
5,416 Navy personnel (enlisted) discharged in FY99 is $71.1 
million. The total replacement costs under the 
"agriculture" cost methodology is $177.1 million. 
D.   SUMMARY 
This chapter described the consequences of the "zero 
tolerance" policy with respect to the cost of replacing 
discharged personnel. Using continuation rates and cohort 
survival rates allows us to calculate the number of 
accessions necessary to replace individuals discharged at 
various YOS. Applying this "agriculture" cost methodology, 
which represents an upper-bound cost estimate, the cost of 
discharges in FY99 was $177.1 million. A one-for-one 
replacement methodology provided a lower-bound cost 
estimate of $71.1 million. 
It should be noted here, however, that both cost 
calculations, especially the costs calculated under the 
"agriculture" cost assumption, are downward biased for 
several reasons. First, given the current robust labor 
market conditions, the military in general must compete 
with civilian firms. In order to meet recruiting and 
retention goals, the Navy has to create incentives in the 
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form of enlistment or reenlistment bonuses. These bonuses 
(although provided by COMET), were omitted, since the 
amount and the bonus offer depend on the time of the year 
and the fluctuations in recruiting success. Omitting 
bonuses biases the calculated costs downward. 
Secondly, setting the cut-off point for necessary 
accessions for those with YOS greater than 20 also biases 
cost estimates downward. 
Thirdly, for some ratings, specific training and 
recruiting costs were not available. We applied the "All 
Navy" average replacement cost in these cases, which may 
generate some replacement error. 
These potential biases, taken together, ensure that 
the cost estimates are conservative. This is acceptable 
since it biases the cost-benefit calculations in favor of 
the .drug policy. If the zero tolerance policy is unable to 
meet the positive net benefit test under these assumptions, 
we will be more confident in the conclusion that the 
program is not efficient. 
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IV. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
A.   BACKGROUND 
In the previous chapters, this thesis demonstrated the 
existence of a positive deterrence effect from the 
implementation and enforcement of the Navy's zero tolerance 
policy. The thesis also demonstrated that the magnitude of 
the deterrence effect varies significantly, depending on 
which drug measure is used, and which comparison groups are 
selected. The cost of the zero tolerance policy was 
calculated using COMET. This chapter applies the estimates 
from Chapters II and III in a cost-benefit analysis, which 
accounts for the costs of the zero tolerance policy and the 
benefits to the Navy. 
Previous studies have calculated the effects of drug 
and/or alcohol use on employee productivity to measure the 
benefits of implementing and enforcing a drug 
reduction/prevention policy. The associated benefits of 
such a policy is in terms of costs avoided by the 
organization, rather than in terms of economic profit. 
Measuring benefits as costs avoided is a common practice, 
especially when programs produce mostly internal 
improvements to an organization. The complication of this 
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approach, however, lies in the difficulty of observing the 
magnitude of the actual degradation in employee 
productivity due to drug use, and thus measuring the 
improvements in productivity associated with programs that 
reduce drug use. 
Extensive research on the effects of drug and/or 
alcohol use confirms that heavy users of drugs or alcohol 
are significantly more prone to absenteeism and tardiness, 
to make more on the job errors, to cause more accidents, 
and be to file claims for disability or health insurance 
for medical treatment not related to drugs. [Ref. 34 and 
Ref. 35] In the absence of a classical, controlled 
experiment, however, it is difficult to determine the exact 
differences in these drug-related outcomes. Little 
information exists on the productivity differences between 
employees who do and do not use drugs. When information 
does exist, "it is difficult to link the contribution of 
the observed difference (such as in errors made on the job 
or absenteeism) to differences in productivity and even 
more difficult to assess the monetary value of that 
difference to the organization." [Ref. 36] 
In organizations such as the Navy that produce an 
output that is intangible (such as "national defense" or 
"readiness"), it is even more difficult to measure 
differences in productivity. As a result, an indirect 
approach is adopted in this thesis. Basic labor economics 
hypothesizes that holding job characteristics and workers' 
human capital constant, workers are paid on the basis of 
their current productivity in the organization (marginal 
productivity) [Ref. 37] . Our indirect approach relies on 
the assumption that workers are paid on this basis. 
Observable pay differences between drug users and non- 
users, holding all other characteristics constant, should 
provide a measure of the actual productivity differences 
due to drug use. 
B.   METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS FOR BENEFITS 
1.   Degradation Factor 
To implement the indirect approach,  we adopt prior 
estimates of the effects of drug use on male earnings. 
Information/studies of the effects of drug use on female 
wages were not available. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter,  the DMDC data  set  contains  94% males  and  6% 
females. Hence, the focus is primarily on males. Table 33 
summarizes the estimated effects of alcohol and drug use on 
earnings derived from previous econometric studies.  [Ref. 
38 and Ref. 39] 
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Borack and Mehay [Ref. 36] used the indirect approach 
to measure the benefits of drug prevention programs. This 
thesis modifies their approach in several ways. Since this 
thesis focuses on the effects of drug use only, degradation 
factors associated with alcohol use might not represent the 
"true" effects of drug use. Hence, the studies by Mullahy 
and Sindelar (1993 and 1994), on the effects of alcohol use 
on male wages, which were relied on by Borack and Mehay, 
are not used in this thesis. The study by French et al. 
[Ref. 40] on the effects of receiving treatment on the 
difference between pre- and post- treatment earnings have 
been ignored as well. Their study compares the treatment 
effect on earnings, but does not investigate how far the 
treatment lifts the "ex-abuser's" wage toward the level of 
a non-user. If, for example, a user's wage was degraded by 
0.2% and the treatment, as shown in Table 33, increased the 
person's wage by 0.16%, s/he is still 0.04 % below the non- 
user's wage. In this case, a "true" degradation factor of - 
0.04 % should be applied in a cost-benefit analysis. 
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Study Explanatory Variable 





Estimate      Estimate 
-0.279 -0.400 
+0.060 +0.160 
-0.726   
-0.169   
0   
-0.137 -0.224 
-0.225   
-0.940 -0.106 
-0.790 -0.086 
-0.523   
-0.188 -0.369 
-0.220 -0.290 
Harwood, et al. (1984)       Marijuana use 
French, et al. (1990) b     Received treatment 
Register and Williams (1992)  On-the-job marijuana use 
Register and Williams (1992)  Long-term marijuana use 
Register and Williams (1992)  Cocaine use 
Lifetime cocaine use 
New cocaine user 
Past 30-day cocaine use 
Lifetime marijuana use 
Kaestner (1984) New marijuana use 
Mullahy and Sindelar (1993)  Alcoholism 
Mullahy and Sindelar (1994)  Alcoholism 
Source: Borack, Jules I., Mehay, Stephen L. "A Conceptual Model for Determining an 
Optimal Drug Testing Program". Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, 
San Diego, CA. January 1996. 
* Each study uses a different methodology to obtain the low and high estimates: 
approaches include using different data sets (e.g., cross sectional vs. panel 
data),  different estimators  (e.g.,  fixed effects vs.  simple ordinary least 
squares), and different model specifications, among others. 
b
 French et al. (1990) examine the effect of receiving treatment on the difference 
between pre- and post-treatment earnings. 
Table 33. Alternative Estimates of Effect and Drug and 
Alcohol Abuse on Male Wages. 
A degradation factor of zero, according to the study 
by Register & Williams [Ref. 41] on cocaine use, seems 
unreasonable because the majority of studies on this 
subject have found some effect. Therefore, this study has 
been disregarded. Nevertheless, in the following 
sensitivity analysis, an extreme factor such as zero is 
considered. 
In this part of the thesis, market wage differences 
will be used as a measure of how far and to what extent an 
employee's wage degrades due to drug use. That is, what 
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effect does using drugs have on productivity of drug users 
compared to non-users? The underlying assumption of this 
approach is that a drug user's marginal product (MP), 
although positive, is degraded by his or her drug usage. 
The degradation factor (d) can be viewed as a tax on 
output: [Ref. 36] 
MPa = MPP * (1-d) 
where:    MPa = actual marginal product 
MPP = perceived marginal product 
d = degradation factor 
Because the Navy's output is intangible, Navy 
personnel are paid on the basis of perceived rather than 
actual productivity. Perceived productivity, however, is 
assumed to be observable and equal to regular military 
compensation (RMC). Therefore, the equation above can be 
rewritten as follows: 
MPa = RMC * (1-d) 
where:    RMC = regular military compensation 
The difficult task in cost-benefit analysis is to 
identify the magnitude of the true degradation factor (d) , 
for the reasons mentioned. As a result the following 
assumptions for the analysis were made. 
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From Table 33 the degradation factors from the various 
prior studies range from approximately zero to as high as 
0.726. Ignoring the studies by Mullahy and Sindelar (1993, 
1994) as well as the studies by French et al. (1990) does 
not affect the range of estimates. From the remaining 
studies, the lowest estimate of 0.079 (Register & Williams, 
for lifetime cocaine use) and the highest estimate of 0.726 
(also Register & Williams for on-the-job marijuana use) 
were selected in order to get a lower-bound and upper-bound 
estimate of the degradation factor. Furthermore, a value of 
0.2420, derived as the mean effect from the remaining 
studies in Table 33, also was adopted. 
2.   Benefits from Detecting Drug Users 
The primary analysis of the FY99 DMDC data set, 
described in the previous chapter, provides an insight into 
the distribution of drug users by paygrade. Since roughly 
99% of the detected drug use occurs in the enlisted 
paygrades, E-l through E-9, a weighted average annual RMC 
for FY99 is calculated for all paygrades. This is done 
using personnel inventories from the FY99 DMDC data set. 
The assumption here is that the available DMDC data set 
represents a sample of the actual target group at which the 
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policy aims. The calculation results in an average RMC of 
$22,745. 
Table 34 summarizes the annual (and daily, based on 
the average civilian work year of 250 days) benefits to the 
Navy  of  discharging  the  5,416  detected  drug  users 
(enlisted)  in FY99,  after applying the three different 
(low, mean, high) degradation factors. 
Degradation Factor 
Lowa Meanb Highc 
Annually 















Notes:   Average annual RMC = S 22,745 
N - 5 , A 11 
'Degradation factor (low) = -0.079 
' Degradation factor (mean) = -0.242 
Degradation factor (high) = -0.726 
Table 34. Annual/Daily Benefits to the Navy due to 
Detection Effect. 
Unfortunately, the calculations in Table 34 must be 
adjusted for the following reasons. The Navy's end-strength 
(enlisted) on September 30, 1999 was 314,272 [Ref. 42]. In 
FY99, 5,416 Navy personnel were detected and discharged due 
to drug use, which results in an annual detection rate of 
1.72%. This detection rate, however, cannot be treated as 
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the "true" detection rate, because to maintain end-strength 
the Navy must recruit 5,416 new enlistees to replace those 
discharged, and some drug users will be included among the 
new enlistments needed to replace the discharged personnel, 
thereby decreasing the net detection rate (1.72%). No 
observed information currently exists about the drug users 
that the enlistment process fails to detect upon entry. 
Hence, the assumption, made by Borack and Mehay, that 
approximately 4% of those who replace the discharged 
personnel are drug users, is adopted. Applying this 
percentage to the model, the "true" detection effect 
becomes: 
5,446 * (1-0.04) = 5,199. 
Table 35 presents the benefits to the Navy (compared 
to Table 34), after applying the adjusted detection effect. 
Degradation Factor 



















Notes:    Average annual RMC = S 22,745 
N = 5,199 
"Degradation factor (low) = -0.079 
"Degradation factor (mean) = -0.242 
cDegradation factor (high)   = -0.726 
Table 35. Annual Benefits to the Navy using the Adjusted 
Detection Effect. 
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3.   Benefits from Deterring Potential Drug Users 
The annual benefit of the program, associated with the 
deterrence effect, is computed as follows. The results from 
the previous chapter (Table 25) indicated that, given the 
current testing rate, the program results in a deterrence 
effect (for past year drug participation) of approximately 
9.7 6 percentage points. This means that the usage rate with 
the "zero tolerance" policy is 9.76 percentage points lower 
than it otherwise would be (for ages 17-49) . About 5% of 
the Navy personnel in 1995 used drugs within the past year. 
Thus, Navy personnel would have a usage rate of roughly 
14.7 6 percentage points without the program. 
The annual number of personnel deterred in FY99 due to 
the existing policy can be calculated by applying the 
deterrence effect of 9.76 percentage points to the end- 
strength on September 30, 1999 of 314,272 (enlisted) 
yielding 30,673 deterred users. Multiplying the total 
number of Navy personnel deterred in FY99 times the 
degradation factor times the average annual RMC, yields the 
annual benefits (cost avoided) from the deterrence effect. 
These benefits range from $55.1 million (low degradation 
factor) to $506.5 million (high degradation factor), with a 
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middle value of $168.8 million using the mean degradation 
factor. 
Table 36 summarizes the benefits to the Navy, 
combining the benefits from the detection effect (Table 35) 
as well as the deterrence effect. As can be seen, depending 
on the magnitude of the estimated degradation factor, the 
total benefits to the Navy range from roughly $59.5 million 
(low degradation factor), to as high as $547.4 million 








Degradation  Factor Degradation  Factor Degradation  Factor 
Lowa Meanb Highc Lowa Meanb Highc Lowa Meanb Highc 
$9.3 $28.6 $85.5 $55.1 $168.8 $506.5 $64.4 $197.4 $592.0 
Notes:       Average annual RMC = $ 22,745 
N (detection effect) = 5,199 
N (deterrence effect) = 30,673 
* Degradation factor (low) , = -0.079 
bDegradation factor (mean) = -0.242 
cDegradation factor (high) = -0.726 
Table 36. Total Benefit from Detection and Deterrence 
Effect (millions of dollars). 
C.   COST ANALYSIS 
As calculated in the previous chapter, the replacement 
costs the Navy bears by discharging positive drug testers, 
rather than rehabilitating them, ranges from $71.1 million 
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(under the assumption of a 1 for 1 replacement) to as high 
as $177.1 million (under the agriculture replacement cost 
approach). 
However, this is not the only cost the Navy absorbs. 
The drug-testing program incurs several administrative 
costs, including medical labs, salaries for the program 
employees, and administrative costs. In FY99 the Navy spent 
$17.5 million to administer the drug-testing program [Ref. 
43] . Adding this program cost to the replacement costs 
results in an annual cost for FY99 ranging from 
approximately $88.6 million (under the assumption of a 1 
for 1 replacement) to $194.6 million (under the agriculture 
replacement cost assumption). 
Another cost that has to be added is the loss in 
worker productivity caused by compliance with the program. 
On average, Navy enlistees/officers are tested 2.4 times a 
year. It is assumed that providing the urine sample takes 
roughly 10 minutes. To calculate the loss in productivity, 
the number of times a sailor has to provide an urine sample 
(2.4) is multiplied by the time it takes to "produce" the' 
sample (10 minutes) times the Navy's enlisted inventory in 
1999 (313,272). This results in a loss of productivity of 
roughly 52,379 hours. Using the average RMC for FY99, the 
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average hourly wage (based on a 250 working-day year at 8 
hours per day) is $11.37. Multiplying the loss in 
productivity times the hourly wage, yields the total cost 
due to lost productivity of test takers of $1.4 million. 
Summarizing the total costs to the Navy — replacement 
costs, program costs, and costs resulting from lost 
productivity — yields a total cost ranging from $90 
million (under the assumption of a 1 for 1 replacement) to 
$196 million (under the agriculture replacement cost 
assumption). Table 37 summarizes the calculated costs to 



















Notes:                 Av =rage  annual B2< IC  =   $   22,745 
Table 37. Summary Cost Calculations for FY99. Past Year 
Participation (millions of dollars). 
Table 38 summarizes the total costs, gross, and net 
benefits using past year participation. Under the best case 
assumption that the program results in a "true" deterrence 
effect of 9.76 percentage points,  the benefits of the 
program, under the "one-for-one" replacement methodology, 
results in a net loss of $25.6 million (low degradation 
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factor). As soon as the degradation factor exceeds 0.12, 
the program generates in a net benefit, rising to as much 
as $502.0 million (high degradation factor). Thus, 0.12 is 
the breakeven degradation factor. Under the agriculture 
approach, however, the program results in a net loss of 
$131.6 million (low degradation factor). The breakeven 
degradation factor becomes 0.24. Under the assumption of a 
mean degradation factor, the program results in a net 
benefit of $1.4 million; using the high degradation factor 


















Meanb       Highc 
1   for   : 
Agriculture 














Notes:       Average annual RMC = $ 22,745 
N :replacement) = 5,416 
K detection effect) = 5,199 
t." [deterrence effect)        = 30,673 
'Degradation factor (low)    = -0.079 
bDegradation factor (mean)   = -0.242 
'Degradation factor (high)   = -0.726 
Table 38. Summary Cost-Benefit Analysis. Past Year 
Participation  (millions of dollars). 
As we have seen in Chapter II, the deterrence effect 
for the past month participation differs significantly from 
that  of  the  past  year  participation.  The  estimated 
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deterrence effect is only -0.78 percentage points. About 3% 
of the Navy personnel in 1995 used drugs within the past 
year. Thus, Navy personnel would have a usage rate of 
roughly 3.78 percentage points, without the program. If we 
apply the deterrence effect for this drug measure to the 
















Lowa         Meanb       Highc 
1  for  1 $90 $13.7 $42.1 $126.3 ($76.3) ($47.9) $36.3 
Agriculture $196 $13.7 $42.1 $126.3 ($182.3) ($153.9) ($69.7) 
Notes:       All numbers in millions 
Average annual RMC = $ 22,745 
N (replacement) = 5,416 
N (detection effect) = 5,199 
N (deterrence effect) = 2,451 
"Degradation factor (low) = -0.079 
bDegradation factor (mean) = -0.242 
cDegradation factor (high) = -0.726 
Table 39. Summary Cost-Benefit Analysis. Past Month 
Participation (millions of dollars). 
As can be seen from Table 39, the cost benefit 
analysis under both methodologies ("one-for-one" and 
"agriculture") results in net losses from $47.9 million up 
to $182.3 million for the low and mean degradation factors. 
The program starts to be beneficial as soon as the 
breakeven degradation factor of 0.52 is reached, resulting 
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in a net benefit of $36.3 million, using the "one for one" 
replacement cost assumption. 
D.   SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
So far, this thesis chapter has shown that three 
factors drive the cost effectiveness of the Navy's 
prevention program: (1) the degradation factor (d) , (2) the 
net detection effect, and (3) the deterrence effect. In 
addition, this thesis was unable to exactly pinpoint each 
of the main driving factors. In cases in which we face some 
uncertainty about the magnitude of the estimates, the cost- 
benefit literature suggests we conduct a partial 
sensitivity analysis in which the factors are changed over 
a predetermined range, one at a time, while holding the 
others constant [Ref. 44] . In the previous cost-benefit 
analysis, we used the most plausible estimates of these 
unknown factors, which form the base case in the following 
sensitivity analysis. Table 40 provides an overview of the 
base values and the chosen ranges, which we alter to re- 
estimate the net benefits for the past year and past month 
participation models. 
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Factor Base Value Range 
Degradation 
(Low) (Mean) (High) 
0-0.7 
-0.079 -0.242 0.726 
Detection Effect 96% 94-98% 
Deterrence Effect 
(Past Year) 
9.76% points 6-10% points 
Deterrence Effect 
(Past Month) 
0.78% points 0-5% points 
Table 40. Base Value and Range for Sensitivity Analysis. 
Past Year/Past Month Participation. 
Since the cost-benefit calculations for both drug 
measures are the same and the chosen ranges are 
overlapping, the sensitivity calculations for past year and 
past month participation were combined. Furthermore, for 
the reasons described earlier in this chapter the 
sensitivity analysis is restricted to the agriculture 
approach only, because we believe it is more realistic. 
The findings of the sensitivity analysis are 
summarized in Appendix Q. The analysis shows that the 
"true" detection rate, given the chosen range, is the 
parameter with the smallest impact on the net benefit 
outcome. Although the magnitude of the net benefits/net 
losses varies, the general combination of degradation 
factor  and  deterrence  effect,  at  which  the  program 
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generates a positive net benefit, does not. The general 
combination is shown in Table 41. 
Degradation Factor 

















0 - - - - - - - - 
2 - - - - - - - - 
4 - - - - - + + + 
6 - - - - + + + + 
8 - - - + + + + + 
10 - - - + + + + + 
12 - - + + + + + + 
14 - - + + + + + + 
16 ,•« - + + + + + + 
18 - - + + + + + + 
20 - - + + + + + + 
Notes: - indicates Net Loss 
+ indicates Net Benefit 
Table 41. Combined Sensitivity Analysis of Net Benefits 
(Agriculture Cost Approach). 
If the deterrence effect ranges between zero and two 
percentage points, the magnitude of the degradation factor 
does not have enough weight to generate positive net 
benefits for the program. If the deterrence effect is 4%, 
the degradation factor must exceed 0.4 in order to produce 
a net benefit. A deterrence effect of 10% still requires a 
degradation factor of 0.3 to make the program beneficial. 
If the loss in productivity (degradation factor) lies 
somewhere below 20% (or 0.2), the deterrence effect must 
exceed 20% in order to result in a beneficial outcome of 
the program. 
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E.   SUMMARY 
This chapter has shown how complex and far-reaching 
the implementation and the enforcement of the Navy's "zero 
tolerance" policy is. As can clearly be seen from the cost- 
benefit analysis, the "true" magnitude of the degradation 
factor (d) and the deterrence effect are the main 
parameters in determining whether the program is cost 
effective. As summarized in Table 42, the result of the 
policy, based on the past year participation measure and 
the base values, can range from a net loss of $131.6 
million to a net benefit of $ 502.0 million, depending on 





















1   for   : c    c*" $64.4 $197.4 $592.0 ($25.6) $107.4 $502.0 
Agriculture S   196 $54.4 $197.4 $592.0 ($131.6) $1.4 $396.0 
Notes:       Average annual RMC = $ 22,745 
N (replacement) = 5,416 
K (detection effect) = 5,199 
N (deterrence effect)        = 30,673 
'Degradation factor (low)    = -0.079 
b
 Degradation factor (mean)   = -0.242 
cDegradation factor (high)   = -0.726 
Table 42. Summary Cost-Benefit Analysis.  Past Year 
Participation  (millions of dollars). 
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Table 43 again summarizes the results of the policy. 
Based on the past month participation measure and the base 
values, the policy results in a range from a net loss of 












Lowa         Meanb 
Degradation Factor 
Lowa         Meanb       High0 
















Notes:       All numbers in millions 
Average annual RMC = $ 22,745 
N (replacement) = 5,416 
N (detection effect) = 5,199 
N (deterrence effect) = 2,451 
'Degradation factor (low) = -0.079 
bDegradation factor (mean) = -0.242 
cDegradation factor (high) = -0.726 
Table 43. Summary Cost-Benefit Analysis.  Past Month 
Participation  (millions of dollars). 
In addition,  the sensitivity analysis conducted in 
this chapter has shown a clear and robust pattern within 
the chosen range for the values of the most important 
parameters. It has shown that the degradation factor is the 
main factor that impacts the beneficial outcome of the 
program. With the deterrence effects previously found in 
this thesis in mind, a relatively high degradation factor 
is necessary to justify the program. It should be noted 
however,  that  a  degradation  factor  of  0.24  (or  a 
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productivity loss of 24%), which is necessary under the 
agriculture approach for the past year participation model 
to result in a net benefit of zero (break even point) , may 
be unrealistically high. The fact that the U.S. Navy must 
maintain a urinalysis program in order to identify illicit 
drug users suggests the consumption of drugs on the job 
does not manifest itself in ways that are readily 
observable by superiors or co-workers. This suggests that 
the true degradation factor may well be below 24%. If the 
actual loss in productivity were as high as 24%, a well- 
trained corps of senior officers and petty officers (the 
military leaders in a unit) should be able to identify 
which subordinates or peers are using drugs. Hence, a 
urinalysis test program would not be necessary. 
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V.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
A.   CONCLUSION 
The first research question posed by this thesis was: 
Did the implementation of the Navy's drug prevention 
policies achieve the desired results of minimizing drug 
use? The results of this research suggests that the 
implementation of the "zero tolerance" policy resulted in a 
positive deterrence effect for the Navy, ranging from 5.9 
to 22.7 percentage points between 1979/80 and 1985, 
depending on which drug measure is used. Although the 
estimation for 1995 has shown the existence of a positive 
deterrence effect, the results indicate that the deterrence 
effect decreased between 1985 and 1995, ranging from 0.78 
to 9.76 percentage points in 1995. It should be noted, 
however, that the estimated deterrence effect might be . 
biased upward due to underreporting of the respondents in 
the military surveys. Therefore, the "true" deterrence 
effect may be lower than the estimates in this thesis. On 
the other hand, analysts have also pointed out that 
civilian drug use also may be underreported, so it is 
difficult to apply a simple adjustment factor for military 
underreporting. 
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Using a data file which contains socioeconomic 
information of Navy positive drug testers for FY99, the 
second research question this thesis attempted to answer 
was: What is the cost associated with the current "zero 
tolerance" policy? The thesis calculated the replacement 
cost of discharged personnel using two different 
approaches. The first assumed a "one-for-one" replacement, 
and the second used the "agriculture" replacement approach. 
The findings indicate that the replacement costs the Navy 
absorbed in FY99 ranged between $71.1 million (under the 
"one-for-one" replacement cost approach) to $177.1 million 
(under the ."agriculture" replacement cost approach) . 
These cost estimates are rather conservative, since 
costs such as enlistment and reenlistment bonuses were 
omitted. Furthermore, salaries paid to the replacement 
person during the training period were not included in the 
replacement cost calculations. Based on a labor economics 
principle that trainees are paid above their marginal 
productivity during training periods, the salaries of 
trainees should be included as part of replacement cost. 
[Ref. 37] In addition, certain restrictions made in this ■ 
thesis concerning the number of new accessions needed to 
replace  discharges  deliberately  bias  the  calculated 
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replacement costs downward. As a result the true 
replacement costs can be assumed to be higher than those 
used in the thesis. 
Finally, the last research question this thesis 
addressed was: What are the overall costs and benefits of 
the drug testing and "zero tolerance" program? The economic 
benefits to the Navy of discharging positive drug testers 
(detection effect) and deterring potential users 
(deterrence effect) were calculated and weighted against 
the total costs of the program (replacement costs, 
administrative program costs, and lost productivity). Total 
annual costs to the Navy range between $90 million (under 
the "one-for-one" replacement cost approach) to $196 
million (under the "agriculture" replacement cost 
approach). Gross benefits range between $64 million and 
$592 million, for past year participation, depending on the• 
replacement cost approach and the assumed productivity 
degradation factor. The gross benefits for past month 
participation range between $13.7 million and $126.3 
million, again depending on the replacement cost approach 
and the assumed degradation factor. Hence, program net 
benefits range from a net loss of $131.6 million to a net 
benefit of $502 million using past year participation, and 
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range from a net loss of 182.3 million to a net benefit of 
36.3 million using past month participation. 
The sensitivity analysis, conducted for the 
"agriculture" replacement cost approach, which we think is 
the more realistic one, shows that given the estimated 
deterrence effect range (0.78-9.76 percentage points), the 
breakeven degradation factor is 0.24. This is the point at 
which the program begins to generate positive net benefits. 
However, this degradation factor may be unrealistically 
high. As pointed out before, the fact that the U.S. Navy 
must maintain a urinalysis program in order to identify 
illicit drug users suggests that their drug consumption on 
the job does not manifest itself in ways that are readily 
observable by superiors or co-workers. Thus, one can 
conclude that the true degradation factor is well below 
0.24. If the actual loss in productivity were as high as 
0.24, a well-trained corps of senior officers and petty 
officers (the military leaders in a unit) should be able to 
identify which subordinates or peers are using drugs. 
Hence, a urinalysis test program would not be necessary. 
B.   RECOMMENDATION 
Although  the  cost-benefit  analysis  shows  that  the 
current "zero tolerance" policy may generate negative net 
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benefits to the Navy, the analysis must also consider other 
non-monetary and largely non-quantifiable effects of the 
drug prevention policies. One can argue that an 
organization, such as the Navy, which "produces" an outcome 
such as military readiness, must be held to higher 
standards than the civilian sector of society. 
The illicit use of drugs must further be seen and 
treated as unacceptable for the following reasons: First, 
unlike most of the civilian occupations, the military's 
intangible output relies heavily on teams and units rather 
than individuals. No matter how severe or minor drug use 
actually reduces the individual's productivity, it can have 
a significant impact on the team/unit. The degradation of 
an individual (i.e. absenteeism), caused by drug use, is 
likely to degrade the unit's readiness, which can delay or 
prevent the deployment of an entire unit or weapon system 
(i.e. ship or squadron). Second, decreased productivity can 
cause repair times to slow down and thereby hamper a unit's 
ability to fulfill its mission. [Ref. 25] Third, military 
personnel work in ratings or commands, where safety is 
extremely important. Even small accidents, resulting from 
drug use, are likely to increase the risk of injury or 
death not only to the individual but also to coworkers (see 
113 
example USS NIMITZ in Chapter I) . Finally, the majority of 
military personnel work with very expensive, high 
technology equipment, including multi-million dollar 
aircraft or even multi-billion dollar ships and aircraft 
carriers. Even a single serious accident, associated with 
drug use, may impose heavy costs on the military. If for 
example the probability of an accident (p) for a drug user 
is five percent higher than that of a non-user and the 
damage costs are $10 million, the expected value of damage 
for a drug user is $500,000 (E(D) = p*D). Thus, the 
expected value of potential damage can be seen as costs . 
avoided (benefit) to the military resulting from 
discharging positive drug testers and deterring others from 
using drugs. [Ref. 25] 
The calculated costs (replacement costs, 
administrative costs and loss in human capital) associated 
with the current strict enforcement of the policy suggests, 
however that, given the difficulties of meeting enlistment 
and reenlistment goals, the Navy may need to re-evaluate 
the procedure of discharging positive drug testers. Prior 
to the implementation of the "zero tolerance" policy the 
Navy routinely attempted to rehabilitate drug and alcohol 
abusers. We therefore recommend an analysis of the cost- 
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effectiveness of a rehabilitation program for positive drug 
testers. Under the assumption of a prior study by French 
[Ref. 40] that treatment (rehabilitation) increases a drug 
user's productivity to or close to the level of a non-user, 
the cost-effectiveness analysis should calculate and weigh 
the costs of such a program against the benefits of 
preserving the Navy's investment in human capital. 
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APPENDIX A.  MEANS FROM 1979 NHSDA AND 1980 DODWWS 








































Age 17 - 2C 
Age 21-25 
Age 2 6 - 3i 





~1  if respondent reports using any 
illicit drug in the past month 
=1 if respondent reports using any 
illicit drug in the past year 
"1 if respondent is married 
=1 if respondent has high school 
diploma 
=1 if respondent attended college but 
did not attain diploma 
=1 if respondent has college degree 
"1 if respondent's age (in years) 
falls in category 
=1 if respondent's age (in years) 
falls in category 
=1 if respondent's age (in years) 
falls in category 
=1 if respondent's age (in years) 
falls in category 
=1 if respondent is Black , Negro or 
African American 
rl if respondent is Hispanic 
"1 if respondent is other racial / 
ethnic minority 
=1 if respondent is female 
Note: Restricted to ages 17 -49. 
Military sample = 15,268; civilian sample 
Standard Deviation in parenthesis 
Including officers and professionals 
4,624 
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APPENDIX B.  MEANS FROM 1995 NHSDA AND DODWWS 








































Age 17 - 20 







=1 if respondent reports using any 
illicit drug in the past month 
=1 if respondent reports using any 
illicit drug in the past year 
=1 if respondent is married 
=1 if respondent has high school diploma 
=1 if respondent attended college but did 
not attain diploma 
=1 if respondent has college degree 
=1 if respondent's age (in years) 
falls in category 
=1 if respondent's age (in years) 
falls in category 
=1 if respondent's age (in years) 
falls in category 
=1 if respondent's age (in years) 
falls in category 
=1 if respondent is Black , Negro or 
African American 
=1 if respondent is Hispanic 
=1 if respondent is other racial / ethnic 
minority 
=1 if respondent is female 
Note:  Restricted to ages 17 -49. 
Military sample = 16,058; civilian sample = 12,012 
Standard Deviation in parenthesis 
Including officers and professionals 
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APPENDIX C.  SAS CODE FOR THE 1979 NHSDA AND 1980 
DODWWS 
***************************************; 
***** RESTRICTED TO AGE 17-49 ****; 
**************************************** 
***** CODE FOR 1980 DODWWS DATA ***** 
**************************************** 
DATA DOD (KEEP = DRÜG30 DRUG12 MALE FEMALE 
SINGLE MARRIED WHITE BLACK HISPANIC OTHRACE AGE1 
AGE2 AGE3 AGE4 NOHSDG HSDG SOMCOLL COLLGRAD 
MIL PAYGRADE Q41A Q41B Q41C Q41D Q41E Q41F Q41G Q41H Q41I 
Q5 AGE RAETHNIC); 
LENGTH DRUG30 DRUG12 MIL MALE FEMALE 
SINGLE MARRIED WHITE BLACK HISPANIC OTHRACE AGE1 
AGE2 AGE3 AGE4 NOHSDG HSDG SOMCOLL COLLGRAD 
PAYGRADE Q41A Q41B Q41C Q41D Q41E Q41F Q41G Q41H Q41I 
AGE RAETHNIC 2; 
SET SASIN1.WWD80; 
MIL=1 ; 
***** DELETING OFFICERS *****; 
IF PAYGRADE = 10 OR 
PAYGRADE = 11 OR 
PAYGRADE = 12 OR 
PAYGRADE = 13 OR 
PAYGRADE = 14 OR 
PAYGRADE =15 THEN DELETE; 
*****     CREATING DUMMY VARIABLES     *****; 
*****     RECODING 30 DAY DRUG USE VARIABLE     *****; 
IF DRUG30 = 1 THEN DRUG30 =1; 
ELSE DRUG30 = 0; 
*****     RECODING 1 YEAR DRUG USE VARIABLE     *****,- 
AND Q41A LE 6) OR 
AND Q41B LE 6) OR 
AND Q41C LE 6) OR 
AND Q41D LE 6) OR 
AND Q41E LE 6) OR 
AND Q41F LE 6) OR 
AND Q41G LE 6) OR 
AND Q41H LE 6) OR 
AND Q41I LE 6) THEN DRUG12 = 1; 
ELSE DRUG12 = 0; 
*****     RECODING GENDER VARIABLE     *****; 
IF SEX = 1 THEN MALE = 1; 
ELSE MALE = 0 ; 
IF SEX = 2 THEN FEMALE = 1; 
ELSE FEMALE = 0; 
*****     RECODING MARITAL STATUS VARIABLE     *****; 
IF Q5 GE 2 AND Q5 LE 5 THEN SINGLE = 1; 
ELSE SINGLE = 0; 
IF Q5 = 1 THEN MARRIED = 1 ; 
ELSE MARRIED = 0; 
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IF (Q41A GE 2 
(Q41B GE 2 
(Q41C GE 2 
(04ID GE 2 
(Q41E GE 2 
(Q41F GE 2 
(Q41G GE 2 
(Q41H GE 2 
(Q41I GE 2 
*****     RECODING ETHNIC RACE VARIABLE     *****; 
IF RAETHNIC = 1 THEN WHITE = 1; 
ELSE WHITE = 0; 
IF RAETHNIC = 2 THEN BLACK = 1; 
ELSE BLACK = 0; 
IF RAETHNIC = 3 THEN HISPANIC = 1; 
ELSE HISPANIC = 0; 
IF RAETHNIC = 4 THEN OTHRACE = 1; 
ELSE OTHRACE = 0; 
*****     RECODING AGE VARIABLE INTO FINAL GROUPS     *****, 
IF AGE GE 1 AND AGE LE 4 THEN AGE1 = 1; 
ELSE AGE1 = 0; 
IF AGE GE 5 AND AGE LE .11 THEN AGE2 = 1; 
ELSE AGE2 = 0; 
IF AGE GE 12 AND AGE LE 16 THEN AGE3 = 1; 
ELSE AGE3 = 0; 
IF AGE GE 17 AND AGE LE 18 THEN AGE4 = 1; 
ELSE AGE4 = 0; 
*****    RECODING EDUCATION VARIABLE     *****; 
IF EDLEVEL IN (1,3) THEN NOHSDG = 1; 
ELSE NOHSDG = 0; 
IF EDLEVEL = 2 THEN HSDG = 1; 
ELSE HSDG = 0; 
IF EDLEVEL = 4 OR 
EDLEVEL = 5 THEN SOMCOLL = 1; 
ELSE SOMCOLL = 0; 
IF EDLEVEL = 6 OR 
EDLEVEL = 7 OR 
EDLEVEL = 8 THEN COLLGRAD = 1; 
ELSE COLLGRAD = 0; 
***************************************, 
*****  CODE FOR 1979 NHSDA DATA   *****, 
***************************************, 
DATA NHSDA (KEEP = DRUG30 DRUG12 CIV MALE FEMALE 
SINGLE MARRIED WHITE BLACK HISPANIC OTHRACE AGE1 
AGE2 AGE3 AGE4 NOHSDG HSDG SOMCOLL COLLGRAD 
ROCCUP2 PROF IRAGE IRSEX IRMARIT); 
LENGTH DRUG30 DRUG12 CIV MALE FEMALE 
SINGLE MARRIED WHITE BLACK HISPANIC OTHRACE AGE1 
AGE2 AGE3 AGE4 IRAGE NOHSDG HSDG SOMCOLL COLLGRAD 
ROCCUP2 PROF 2; 
SET SASIN2.NHSDA79; 
CIV = 1 ; 
*****     CREATING DUMMY VARIABLES     *****: 
*****     RECODING 30 DAY DRUG USE VARIABLE     *****; 
IF SUMMON = 1 THEN DRUG30 = 1; 
ELSE IF SUMMON = 0 THEN DRUG30 = 0; 
*****     RECODING 1 YEAR DRUG USE VARIABLE     *****; 
IF SUMYR = 1 THEN DRUG12 = 1; 
ELSE IF SUMYR = 0 THEN DRUG12 = 0; 
*****     RECODING GENDER VARIABLE     *****; 
IF IRSEX = 1 THEN MALE = 1; 
ELSE MALE = 0; 
IF IRSEX = 2 THEN FEMALE = 1; 
ELSE FEMALE = 0; 
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*****     RECODING MARITAL STATUS VARIABLE     *****; 
IF IRMARIT = 1 THEN MARRIED = 1; 
ELSE MARRIED = 0; 
IF IRMARIT = 2 OR 
IRMARIT = 3 OR 
IRMARIT = 4 OR 
IRMARIT = 5 THEN SINGLE = 1; 
ELSE SINGLE = 0; 
*****     RECODING ETHNIC RACE VARIABLE     *****; 
IF RACE = 1 THEN WHITE = 1; 
ELSE WHITE = 0; 
IF RACE = 2 THEN BLACK = 1; 
ELSE BLACK = 0; 
IF RACE = 3 THEN HISPANIC = 1; 
ELSE HISPANIC = 0; 
IF RACE = 4 THEN OTHRACE = 1; 
ELSE OTHRACE = 0; 
*****     RECODING AGE VARIABLE INTO FINAL GROUPS     *****; 
IF IRAGE GE 17 AND IRAGE LE 20 THEN AGE1 = 1; 
ELSE AGE1 = 0; 
IF IRAGE GE 21 AND IRAGE LE 25 THEN AGE2 = 1; 
ELSE AGE2 = 0; 
IF IRAGE GE 26 AND IRAGE LE 34 THEN AGE3 = 1; 
ELSE AGE3 = 0; 
IF IRAGE GE 35 AND IRAGE LE 49 THEN AGE4 = 1; 
ELSE AGE4 = 0; 
*****     RECODING EDUCATION VARIABLE     *****; 
IF EDUCCAT2 = 1 THEN NOHSDG =1; 
ELSE NOHSDG = 0; 
IF EDUCCAT2 = 2 THEN HSDG = 1; 
ELSE HSDG = 0; 
IF EDUCCAT2 = 3 THEN SOMCOLL = 1; 
ELSE SOMCOLL = 0; 
IF EDUCCAT2 = 4 THEN COLLGRAD =1; 
ELSE COLLGRAD = 0; 
***** SAS CODE TO CREATE DUMMY FOR PROF OCCUPS. *****; 
IF ROCCUP2 IN (1,2) THEN PROF = 1; 
ELSE PROF = 0; 
***** DELETING PROFESSIONALS *****; 
IF PROF = 1 THEN DELETE; 
*********************************************************** 
***** CODE FOR COMBINED NHSDA DODWWS DATASETS ***** 
*********************************************************** 
DATA MERGE 1; 
SET DOD NHSDA; 
DATA MERGE2; 
SET MERGE1; 
* LIMIT AGE FROM 17 TO 49; 
IF AGE1=1 OR AGE2=1 OR AGE3=1 OR AGE4=1; 
IF CIV = 1 THEN CIVILIAN = 1; 
ELSE CIVILIAN = 0; 
IF MIL = 1 THEN MILITARY = 1; 
ELSE MILITARY = 0; 
PROC MEANS; 
VAR DRUG30 DRUG12 CIVILIAN FEMALE 
MARRIED BLACK HISPANIC OTHRACE AGE1 AGE2 AGE3 
123 
MILITARY 
AGE4   HSDG  SOMCOLL  COLLGRAD; 
WHERE  MIL=1; 
PROC MEANS; 
VAR DRUG30  DRUG12   CIVILIAN  FEMALE 
MARRIED  BLACK  HISPANIC  OTHRACE  AGE1  AGE2  AGE3 
MILITARY 
AGE4   HSDG  SOMCOLL  COLLGRAD; 
WHERE   CIV=1; 
PROC MEANS; 
VAR DRUG30  DRUG12   CIV FEMALE 
MARRIED  BLACK HISPANIC  OTHRACE AGE1  AGE2  AGE3 MIL 
AGE4  HSDG  SOMCOLL  COLLGRAD; 
PROC  TTEST; 
CLASS MILITARY; 
VAR DRUG30  DRUG12   HEAVY  CIV MALE   FEMALE   SINGLE  LITE 
MARRIED WHITE  BLACK HISPANIC  OTHRACE  AGE1  AGE2  AGE3 MIL 
AGE4 NOHSDG HSDG SOMCOLL COLLGRAD; 
PROC  LOGISTIC DESCENDING DATA = MERGE2; 
MODEL  DRUG12   = MILITARY  FEMALE  MARRIED  BLACK  HISPANIC 
OTHRACE   HSDG  SOMCOLL  COLLGRAD 
AGE1  AGE2  AGE3; 
PROC  LOGISTIC  DESCENDING DATA = MERGE2; 
MODEL  DRUG30   = MILITARY  FEMALE  MARRIED  BLACK  HISPANIC 
OTHRACE   HSDG  SOMCOLL  COLLGRAD 
AGE1  AGE2  AGE3; 
***** MARGINAL   PROBABILITY  LOGIT  ANALYSIS *****; 
***** BASE   CASE *****; 
***** CIVILIAN MALE   SINGLE  WHITE  AGE4   HSDG     *****; 
DATA TWO; 
INPUT MILITARY  FEMALE  MARRIED  BLACK HISPANIC  OTHRACE 
AGE1  AGE2  AGE3   HSDG  SOMCOLL  COLLGRAD; 
KEEPME   =   1; 
CARDS; 
0 .196   .48   .18   .05   .03   .25   .36   .24   .45   .32   .04   *  NOTIONAL 
1 .196   .48   .18   .05   .03   .25   .36   .24   .45   .32   .04   *  MILITARY 
t 
DATA THREE; 
SET MERGE2   TWO; 
PROC  LOGISTIC DATA =  THREE  DESCENDING MAXITER =  250; 
MODEL DRÜG12   = MILITARY  FEMALE  MARRIED  BLACK HISPANIC  OTHRACE 
AGE1  AGE2  AGE3   HSDG  SOMCOLL  COLLGRAD; 
OUTPUT  OUT  = MARGDG12   P = YHAT; 
TITLE   'MARGINAL  PROBABILITY LOGIT  DRUG12'; 
PROC  LOGISTIC  DATA  =   THREE  DESCENDING MAXITER =  250; 
MODEL  DRUG30   = MILITARY  FEMALE  MARRIED  BLACK HISPANIC   OTHRACE 
AGE1  AGE2  AGE3   HSDG  SOMCOLL  COLLGRAD; 
OUTPUT  OUT  = MARGDG30   P  =  YHAT; 
TITLE    'MARGINAL   PROBABILITY  LOGIT  DRUG30'; 
PROC  PRINT DATA = MARGDG12 ; 
VAR YHAT  DRUG12  MILITARY  FEMALE  MARRIED  BLACK HISPANIC 
OTHRACE  AGE1  AGE2  AGE3  HSDG  SOMCOLL  COLLGRAD; 
WHERE    (KEEPME  =   1); 
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TITLE 'PREDICTED PROBABILITIES MARGINAL EFFECTS DRUG12' 
PROC PRINT DATA = MARGDG30; 
VAR YHAT DRÜG30 MILITARY FEMALE MARRIED BLACK HISPANIC 
OTHRACE AGE1 AGE2 AGE3 HSDG SOMCOLL COLLGRAD; 
WHERE (KEEPME = 1); 
TITLE 'PREDICTED PROBABILITIES MARGINAL EFFECTS DRUG30' 
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APPENDIX D.  LOGIT ESTIMATES OF ANY ILLICIT DRUG 
PARTICIPATION, 1979/80, RESTRICTED SAMPLE, AGES 17- 
49 
Past Year Past Month 























































Log likelihood 19,228.87 15,485.14 
N 17,266 17,266 
Notes:   Merged 197 9 NHSDA 1980 DODWWS 
a
 Standard errors are parentheses 
b
 Marginal effects in brackets 
127 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
128 
APPENDIX E.      LOGIT  ESTIMATES  OF ANY   ILLICIT  DRUG 








Age   17   -   20 
Age   21   -   25 
Age  26-34 
High  School  Diploma 
Some  College 



































Notes:   Merged 1985 NHSDA/ DODWWS 
a
 Standard errors are parentheses 
b
 Marginal effects in brackets 
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APPENDIX F.  LOGIT ESTIMATES OF ANY ILLICIT DRUG 








Age 17 - 20 
Age 21 - 25 
Age 26 - 34 






Notes:   Merged 1995 NHSDA/DODWWS 
a
 Standard errors are parentheses 
b
 Marginal effects in brackets 
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APPENDIX G.  LOGIT ESTIMATES OF ANY ILLICIT DRUG 
PARTICIPATION, 1979/80, RESTRICTED SAMPLE, AGES 17- 






Other  Race 
Age   17   -   20 
Age   21   -   25 
Age  26-34 
High  School   Diploma 
Some  College 

































Notes: Merged 1979 NHSDA and 1980 DODWWS 
a
 Standard errors are parentheses 
b
 Marginal effects in brackets 
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APPENDIX  H.      LOGIT  ESTIMATES  OF ANY   ILLICIT  DRUG 
PARTICIPATION,   1985,   RESTRICTED   SAMPLE,   AGES   17-49, 






Other  Race 
Age   1"   -   2C 
Age   21   -   21 
Age   Zi   -   j-A 
High   Szr.zzi   diploma 
Some   Ccilege 

































Notes:   Merged 1985 NHSDA/DODWWS 
a
 Standard errors are parentheses 
b
 Marginal effects in brackets 
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APPENDIX I.  LOGIT ESTIMATES OF ANY ILLICIT DRUG 
PARTICIPATION, 1995, RESTRICTED SAMPLE, AGES 17-49, 






Other  Race 
Age   17   -   20 
Age   21-25 
Age   26-34 



































Notes:   Merged 1995 NHSDA/DODWWS 
a
 Standard errors are parentheses 
b
 Marginal effects in brackets 
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APPENDIX J.  LOGIT ESTIMATES OF ANY ILLICIT DRUG 
PARTICIPATION, 1979/80, RESTRICTED SAMPLE, AGES 17- 
49, NAVY 
Past Year Past Month 























































Log likelihood 19,085.99 15,404.33 
N 17,266 17,266 
Notes:   Merged 197 9 NHSDA 1980 DODWWS 
a
 Standard errors are parentheses 
b
 Marginal effects in brackets 
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APPENDIX K.  LOGIT ESTIMATES OF ANY ILLICIT DRUG 
PARTICIPATION, 1985, RESTRICTED SAMPLE, AGES 17-49, 
NAVY 
Past Year Past Month 























































Log likelihood 11,832.24 9,353.25 
N 17,316 17,411 
Notes:   Merged 1985 NHSDA/DODWWS 
a
 Standard errors are parentheses 
b
 Marginal effects in brackets 
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APPENDIX L.  LOGIT ESTIMATES OF ANY ILLICIT DRUG 
PARTICIPATION, 1995, RESTRICTED SAMPLE, AGES 17-49, 
NAVY 
Variable 
Past Year Past Month 
Participation Participation 
-1.1429 -1.2604 


































Age   17-20 
Age   21   -   25 
Age   26  -   34 






Notes:   Merged 1995 NHSDA/DODWWS 
a
 Standard errors are parentheses 
b
 Marginal effects in brackets 
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APPENDIX M.      LOGIT  ESTIMATES  OF ANY   ILLICIT  DRUG 
PARTICIPATION,   1979/80,   RESTRICTED   SAMPLE,   AGES   17- 






Other  Race 
Age   17   -   20 
Age  21   -  25 
Age  26-34 
High School   Diploma 
Some  College 

































Notes:   Merged 197 9 NHSDA 1980 DODWWS 
a
 Standard errors are parentheses 
b
 Marginal effects in brackets 
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APPENDIX N.  LOGIT ESTIMATES OF ANY ILLICIT DRUG 
PARTICIPATION, 1985, RESTRICTED SAMPLE, AGES 17-49, 







Age 17 - 20 
Age 21 - 25 
Age 26-34 



































Notes:   Merged 1985 NHSDA/DODWWS 
a
 Standard errors are parentheses 
b
 Marginal effects in brackets 
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APPENDIX  O.      LOGIT  ESTIMATES  OF ANY   ILLICIT  DRUG 
PARTICIPATION,   1995,   RESTRICTED   SAMPLE,   AGES   11-49, 







Age   17   -  20 
Age   21   -   25 
Age   26-34 
High  School   Diploma 
Some  College 

































Notes:   Merged 1995 NHSDA/DODWWS 
a
 Standard errors are parentheses 
b
 Marginal effects in brackets 
149 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
150 
APPENDIX P DMDC DATA FILE ON DISCHARGED NAVY 
PERSONNEL 
Educ. Race Primary Duty 
Premise Result Grade Sex Cert Age Ethnic MOS Location YOS 
IR THC 2 1 15 21 1 SA 34 2 
VO LSD 1 1 4 19 1 SR 9 1 
NO THC 1 1 1 18 1 AR 17 1 
IU BZE 2 1 15 20 1 STG0445 6 2 
IR AMP 2 2 15 22 1 SA 51 2 
IR MET 2 2 15 22 1 SA 51 2 
PO MET 3 1 8 28 1 HN 8404 6 2 
IR BZE 4 1 15 23 1 QM 51 5 
NO THC 1 1 15 19 1 SR 17 1 
NO THC 1 1 15 19 1 AR 17 1 
CO MDMA 4 1 15 26 1 RM 131 4 
CO MET 4 1 15 26 1 RM 131 4 
IU MET 5 1 15 31 1 . MM 4513 254 12 
IU THC 4 1 15 22 1 HT 4954 0 3 
VO BZE 4 1 15 22 1 HT 4954 0 3 
VO THC 4 1 15 22 1 HT 4954 0 3 
NO AMP 1 1 15 19 1 SR 17 1 
IU THC 1 1 15 20 1 TM 51 2 
NO THC 1 1 1 18 1 SR 17 1 
IR BARB 4 1 15 22 1 OS 254 4 
PO ■ THC 1 1 15 24 1 SR 254 1 
IR MET 5 1 15 33 1 AS 7607 6 12 
IR THC 5 1 15 33 1 AS 7607 6 12 
IR THC 2 1 15 23 1 SA 15 3 
IU THC 2 1 15 23 1 SA 6 3 
NO THC 1 2 4 20 1 AR 17 1 











Mishap Investigation (Pilot Tri-Service) 
Mishap/Safety/Accident (Pilot Tri-Service) 
Applicant Testing 
Civilian Mishap/Safety (Pilot Tri-Service) 
Command Directed (Pilot Tri-Service) 
CDR directed individual 
Civilian Preemployment (Pilot Tri-Service) 

























Civilian Reasonable Suspicion (Pilot) 
Civilian Random Testing (Pilot Tri-Service) 
Civilian Volunteer (Pilot Tri_service) 
Inspection Generic/Reenlist(Pilot Tri-Service 
Random Sample (Pilot Tri-Service) 
Unit Sweep (Pilot Tri-Service) 
Medical (Pilot Tri-Service) 
Medical (Pilot Tri-Service) 
New Entrant/Officer Cand. (Pilot Tri-Service) 
Field Test (Pilot Tri-Service) 
Other Service Directed Test(Pilot Tri-Service 
Other service directed 
Probable Cause (Pilot Tri-Service Test) 
Physician directed 
Probable Cause (Pilot Tri-Service) 
Rehab patient 
Rehab staff 
Rehabilitation (Pilot Tri-Service) 
Rehab Patient (Pilot Tri-Service) 
Rehab Staff (Pilot Tri_service) 
CDR direct unit 
Consent Testing (Pilot Tri-Service) 
Unknown or Invalid 
Result: 
AMP :     Amphetamine 
BZE :     Cocaine 
COC Cocaine 
COD Codeine 
DME: [■:     Designer Methampetamine 
LSD Lysergic Acid Diethylamide 
MDA Designer Amps 
MDEi \:     Designer Amps 










00: Enlisted Unknown 
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01-09: E01-E09 
10: Warrant Officer unknown 
11-15: W01 - W05 
20: Commissioned Officer Unknown 










0:       UnknowrT 
1:        Less than High School (HS) diploma 
2:       Currently in HS, not senior, alternative trng 
program 
3:        HS senior 
4:        Certificate of HS equivalent 
5:       Certificate of completion of occupational program 
6:        Certificate of attendance at an occupational 
program 
7:       Successful completion of a HS homestudy 
correspondence course 
8:       Adult Education diploma 
9:       Certificate of HS attendance 
10:      Home study diploma 
15:       HS diploma 
16:       NHS grad with one college semester completed 
20:      First year college equivalent 
21:      Associate degree 
22:      Professional nursing diploma 
23:      Baccalaureate 
24:       Masters 
25:       Post masters 
26:       Doctorate 
27:       First Professional 
Source: DMDC 
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APPENDIX Q.  COMBINED SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Net Benefit/Loss (Net Detection Effect = 98% ) 
Degradation Factor 











0 ($196.0) ($184.0) ($171.9) ($159.8) ($147.7) ($135.7) ($123.6) ($111.5) ($99.5) ($87.4) ($75.3) 
2 ($196.0) ($169.7) ($143.3) ($116.9) ($90.6) ($64.2) ($37.8) ($11.5) $14.9 $41.3 $67.7 
4 ($196.0) ($155.4) ($114.7) ($74.0) ($33.4) $7.3 $48.0 $88.6 $129.3 $170.0 $210.6 
6 ($196.0) ($141.1) ($86.1) ($31.1) $23.8 $78.8 $133.7 $188.7 $243.7 $298.6 $353.6 
8 ($196.0) ($126.8) ($57.5) $11.7 $81.0 $150.3 $219.5 $288.8 $358.0 $427.3 $496.5 
10 ($196.0) ($112.5) ($28.9) $54.6 $138.2 $221.7 $305.3 $388.8 $472.4 $555.9 $639.5 
12 ($196.0) ($98.2) ($0.3) $97.5 $195.4 $293.2 $391.1 $488.9 $586.8 $684.6 $782.5 
14 ($196.0) ($83.9) $28.3 $140.4 $252.6 $364.7 $476.8 $589.0 $701.1 $813.3 $925.4 
16 ($196.0) ($69.6) $56.9 $183.3 $309.7 $436.2 $562.6 $689.1 $815.5 $941.9 $1,068.4 
18 ($196.0) ($55.3) $85.4 $226.2 $366.9 $507.7 $648.4 $789.1 $929.9 $1,070.6 $1,211.3 
20 ($196.0) ($41.0) $114.0 $269.1 $424.1 $579.1 $734.2 $889.2 $1,044.2 $1,199.3 $1,354.3 
Net Benefit/Loss (Net Detection Effect = 96% ) 
Degradation Factor 











0 ($196.0) ($184.2) ($172.4) ($160.6) ($148.7) ($136.9) ($125.1) ($113.2) ($101.4) ($89.6) ($77.8) 
2 ($196.0) ($169.9) ($143.8) ($117.7) ($91.5) ($65.4) ($39.3) ($13.2) $12.9 $39.1 $65.2 
4 ($196.0) ($155.6) ($115.2) ($74.8) ($34.4) $6.1 $46.5 $86.9 $127.3 $167.7 $208.2 
6 ($196.0) ($141.3) ($86.6) ($31.9) $22.8 $77.5 $132.3 $187.0 $241.7 $296.4 $351.1 
8 ($196.0) ($127.0) ($58.0) $11.0 $80.0 $149.0 $218.0 $287.0 $356.1 $425.1 $494.1 
10 ($196.0) ($112.7) ($29.4) $53.9 $137.2 $220.5 $303.8 $387.1 $470.4 $553.7 $637.0 
12 ($196.0) ($98.4) ($0.8) $96.8 $194.4 $292.0 $389.6 $487.2 $584.8 $682.4 $780.0 
14 ($196.0) ($84.1) $27.8 $139.7 $251.6 $363.5 $475.4 $587.3 $699.2 $811.1 $923.0 
16 ($196.0) ($69.8) $56.4 $182.6 $308.8 $434.9 $561.1 $687.3 $813.5 $939.7 $1,065.9 
18 ($196.0) ($55.5) $85.0 $225.4 $365.9 $506.4 $646.9 $787.4 $927.9 $1,068.4 $1,208.9 
20 ($196.0) ($41.2) $113.5 $268.3 $423.1 $577.9 $732.7 $887.5 $1,042.3 $1,197.1 $1,351.8 
Net Benefit/Loss (Net Detection Effect = 94% ) 
Degradation Factor 








0 ($196.0) ($184.4) ($172.9) ($161.3) ($149.7) ($138.1) ($126.6) ($115.0) ($103.4) ($91.8) ($80.2) 
2 ($196.0) ($170.2) ($144.3) ($118.4) ($92.5) ($66.7) ($40.8) ($14.9) $11.0 $36.9 $62.7 
4 ($196.0) ($155.9) ($115.7) ($75.5) ($35.3) $4.8 $45.0 $85.2 $125.3 $165.5 $205.7 
6 ($196.0) ($141.6) ($87.1) ($32.6) $21.8 $76.3 $130.8 $185.2 $239.7 $294.2 $348.7 
8 ($196.0) ($127.3) ($58.5) $10.3 $79.0 $147.8 $216.6 $285.3 $354.1 $422.8 $491.6 
10 ($196.0) ($113.0) ($29.9) $53.2 $136.2 $219.3 $302.3 $385.4 $468.5 $551.5 $634.6 
12 ($196.0) ($98.7) ($1.3) $96.0 $193.4 $290.8 $388.1 $485.5 $582.8 $680.2 $777.5 
14 ($196.0) ($84.4) $27.3 $138.9 $250.6 $362.2 $473.9 $585.5 $697.2 $808.8 $920.5 
16 ($196.0) ($70.1) $55.9 $181.8 $307.8 $433.7 $559.7 $685.6 $811.6 $937.5 $1,063.5 
18 ($196.0) ($55.8) $84.5 $224.7 $365.0 $505.2 $645.4 $785.7 $925.9 $1,066.2 $1,206.4 
20 ($196.0) ($41.5) $113.1 $267.6 $422.1 $576.7 $731.2 $885.8 $1,040.3 $1,194.8 $1,349.4 
155 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
156 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
1. George, L. James, "Is Readiness Overrated? 
Implications for a Tiered Readiness Force Structure", 
Policy Analysis, No. 342 April 29, 1999. 
2. Bray, M. Robert, Mary Ellen Marsden, John R. Herbold, 
and Michael R. Peterson, "Progress Toward Eliminating 
Drug and Alcohol Abuse among U.S. Military Personnel. 
Armed Forces & Society Vol 18. 
3. Doster, T.R., and H.A. Ross. 1993 "An Analysis of the 
Effectiveness of the Air Force Drug Testing Program 
and Four Potential Modifications." Master Thesis, Air 
Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air 
Force Base, Ohio (December). 
4. Lieb, M. Patricia. 1986 "An Evaluation of the 
Department of Defense Drug-Testing Program." Master's 
Thesis.  Monterey,  CA: .  Naval  Postgraduate  School 
(March). 
5. U.S. Department of Defense, Directive 1010.4. 1980. 
Alcohol and Drug Abuse by DoD Personnel. Washington, 
D.C. (August). 
6. U.S. Department of Defense, Directive 1010.1. 1984. 
Drug Abuse Testing Program Directive. Washington, 
D.C. (December). 
7. Department of the Navy, Office of the Secretary of the 
Navy Instruction 5300.28A. 1984. Alcohol and Drug 
Abuse  Prevention  and  Control.  Washington,   D.C. 
(January). 
8. Department of the Navy, Office of the Secretary of the 
Navy Instruction 5300.28C. 1999. Military Substance 
Abuse  Prevention  and  Control.  Washington,   D.C. 
(March). 
9. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations Instruction 5350.4. 1980. Substance Abuse 
Prevention and Control.  Washington, D.C. (September). 
157 
10. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations Instruction 5350.4B. 1990. Substance Abuse 
Prevention and Control. Washington D.C. (September). 
11. Mehay, Stephen L. and Pacula Rosalie Liccardo. "The 
Effectiveness of Workplace Drug Prevention Policies: 
Does 'Zero Tolerance' Work?" Working Paper 7383, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, INC. October 
1999. 
12. "National Household Survey of Drug Abuse: Public 
Release Codebook," 1979. Rockville, MD: Substance 
Abuse and Mental Health Service Administration, 1980. 
13. "National Household Survey of Drug Abuse: Main 
Findings 1985." Rockville, MD: Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Service Administration, 1986. 
14. "National Household Survey of Drug Abuse: Public 
Release Codebook," 1985. Rockville, MD: Substance 
Abuse and Mental Health Service Administration, 198 6. 
15. "National Household Survey of Drug Abuse: Main 
Findings 1995." Rockville, MD: Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Service Administration, September, 1996. 
16. "National Household Survey of Drug Abuse: Public 
Release Codebook," 1995. Rockville, MD: Substance 
Abuse and Mental Health Service Administration, April 
1997. 
17.  Burt, M., M. Biegel, Y. Carnes, 
"Worldwide Survey of Nonmedical 
Use Among Military Personnel." 
Associates. 
and E. Farley, 1980. 
Drug Use and Alcohol 
Bethesda,  MD:  Burt 
18. Turner, C, J. Lessler, and J. Devore, 1992. "Effects 
of Mode of Administration and Wording on Reporting of 
Drug Use," in Survey, Measurement of Drug Use: 
Methodological Studies. Washington, DC: National 
Institute of Drug Abuse. 
19. Bray, Robert M., et. al., 1986. "1985 Department of 
Defense Survey of Health Related Behaviors Among 
Military Personnel." Research Triangle Park, NC: 
Research Triangle Institute. 
158 
20. "Codebook for 1985 Department of Defense Survey of 
Health Related Behaviors Among Military Personnel." 
Research Triangle Park, NC: Research Triangle 
Institute 
21. Bray, Robert M. , et. al., 1995. "1995 Department of 
Defense Survey of Health Related Behaviors Among 
Military Personnel." Research Triangle Park, NC: 
Research Triangle Institute. 
22. "Codebook for 1995 Department of Defense Survey of 
Health Related Behaviors Among Military Personnel." 
Research Triangle Park, NC: Research Triangle 
Institute. 
23. Levine, David M., Berenson, Mark L., Stephan. David. 
"Statistics for Managers", Prentice Hall, 2nd Edition, 
New Jersey, 1999. 
24. Gujarati, Damodar N. "Basic Econometrics", McGraw 
Hill, 3rd Edition, 1995. 
25. Pindyck, Robert S. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. 
Econometric Models & Economic Forecasts. McGraw Hill, 
3rd Edition. 1991. 
26. Borack, Jules I., Mehay, Stephen L. "A Conceptual 
Model for Determining an Optimal Drug Testing 
Program". Navy Personnel Research and Development 
Center, San Diego, CA. January 1996. 
27. Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC)-West, Ford Ort, 
Monterey, CA. Prepared by Ann Hamza and Scott 
Seggerman. 
28. Bray, R.M., & Marsden, M.E., (1995). Trends in 
alcohol, illicit drug, and cigarette use among U.S. 
military personnel, Armed Forces & Society, 21(2), 
Winter: 271-293. 
29. CDR Mark H. Dye, USN. Naval Center for Cost Analysis 
(NCCA-412). COMET Model Manager. Nebraska Avenue 
Complex, 4290 Mt. Vernon Dr. Suite 18200, Washington, 
DC 20393-5444. E-Mail correspondence (May - December 
2000). 
159 
30. Makee, Michael D., 1999. "Training Costs for Junior 
Surface Warfare Officers". Master's Thesis. Monterey, 
CA: Naval Postgraduate School (March). 
31. E-Mail Steve Cylke, Assistant for Research & Analysis 
(N13T). (8 August 2000) 
32. E-Mail Steve Muir (BUPERS N793M), NAVEDTRACOM Cost 
Factors Handbook, prepared by NETPDTC Code N842. (24 
October 2000) 
33. Provided by Abigail Gray, Systems Analyst, 
DynMeridian. (8 October 2000) 
34. McGuire, T.G., & Ruhm, C.J. (1993). Defining the 
public  interest  in  workplace  drug  abuse  policy 
(Services  Research Monograph No.l).  Washington  DC: 
National Institute on Drug Abuse 
35. McGuire, T.G., & Ruhm, C.J. (1993). Workplace drug 
abuse policy. Journal of Health Economics, 12(2), 19- 
38 
36. Borack, Jules I., Mehay, Stephen L. "A Conceptual 
Model for Determining an Optimal Drug Testing 
Program". Navy Personnel Research and Development 
Center, San Diego, CA. January 1996. 
37. Ehrenberg, Ronald G., & Smith, Robert S. Modern Labor 
Economics. Addison Wesley Longman, 7th Edition, 2000. 
38. Mullahy, J. , & Sindelar, J. (1993). Alcoholism, work, 
and income. Journal of Labor Economics, 11(3), 494- 
520. 
39. Mullahy, J., & Sindelar, J. (1994). Health, income, 
and risk aversion: Assessing some welfare costs of 
alcoholism and poor health. Working paper No. 4649. 
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
40. French, M.T., Rachal, J.V., Harwood, H.J. & Hubbard, 
R.L. (1990) . Does drug abuse treatment affect 
employment and earnings of clients? Benefits 
Quarterly, 6(2), 58-67. 
160 
41. Register, CA., & Williams, D.R. (1992). Labor Market 
Effects of Marijuana and Cocaine Use among Young Men. 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 45(3), 106 - 
123. 
42. Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), Information 
Delivery System, 
https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/ids/owa/DMDC.login 
43. E-mail William Flannery, (PERS-603) , Head, Drug 
Detection and Deterrence Branch, 13.October 2000. 
44. Boardman, Anthony E., Greenberg, David H., Vining, 
Adrian R., Weimer, David L. Cost-Benefit Analysis: 
Concepts and Practice. Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle 
River, NJ, 1999. 
161 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
162 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1.   Defense Technical Information Center 2 
8725 John J. Kingman Rd., STE 0944 
Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6218 
2 .   Dudley Knox Library 2 
Naval Postgraduate School 
411 Dyer Rd. 
Monterey, CA 93943-5101 
3.   Professor Stephen L. Mehay 1 
Code SM/MP 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
4 .   Associated Professor Natalie J. Webb 1 
Code 64/We 
Defense Resource Management Institute 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
5.   Lieutenant Commander Mary Jane Osmena McCrea 5 
95 Buck Wheat Avenue 
Portsmouth, RI 02871 
6 .   Kapitänleutnant Markus Hey 10 
Max Planck Straße 5 
31675 Bückeburg, Germany 
163 
